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The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the operational intelligence
apparatus that exists to support the U.S. Marine Corps' tactical "warfighting"
commander. The questions that drive such an analysis are: what are the
fundamental uniformities of operations? What are the intelligence
requirements for the most likely conflict? What is the intelligence
architecture? What are the problems of intelligence support? What are the
near-term and long-term remedies for intelligence support in these most
likely conflicts? Based on the recurring intelligence requirements of
historical antecedents, the thesis focuses on the lack of an integrated and
complete intelligence architecture that supports the warfighting commander.
This encompasses a lack of operational connectivity of intelligence within the
larger command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and
interoperability (C4 I2 ) system /architecture. One utility of this thesis is in
isolating the prevalent, realistic, operational and intelligence requirements
for the employment of Marines. Another is in expanding the concept of a
Marine Corps intelligence architecture. Optimizing the Marine Corps for its
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The reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the
enemy wherever they move and their achievements surpass those of
ordinary men is foreknowledge.
Sun Tzu
(Griffith, 1963, p. 144)
One of the most critical problems facing the United States Marine Corps
in the 1990s is the task of establishing an intelligence architecture with the
ability to meet intelligence requirements (IRs) of tactical commanders. If
intelligence is to guide the operational decisions of a Marine commander,
then intelligence support must be tailored to his requirements. Ultimately,
the Marine Corps needs to implement an innovative and highly effective
way to conceptualize and manage the cluster of organizations, doctrines, and
high technology involved in the direction, collection, processing, and
dissemination of intelligence. A good systems approach has not yet matured.
In designing that intelligence architecture, the aim must be to consider its
entirety with particular emphasis on system interfaces and interrelations,
managing it in ways that are compatible with the characteristics and needs of
warfighters.
This thesis and proposition actually encompass numerous features.
Fundamental IRs are the basic independent variables. The dependent
outcome concept is the means for meeting the intelligence requirements—
a
functional architecture. Therefore, IRs must be articulated and well
understood by all forces in the operational and administrative chains of
command in order to ensure tailored intelligence support. Given that
Marines will be involved in future low-intensity conflict (LIC) environments,
an analytical induction process which studies the recurring operational
characteristics of the type of conflict, missions, organizations, and doctrines
should prove useful in articulating the commander's intelligence
requirements and analyzing the intelligence architecture. The Marine Corps
intelligence community needs a vision—an image of the future, grounded by
the requirements of "war as it really is."
A. BACKGROUND TO THE USMC FOCUS IN CONFLICT
A contemporary renaissance in military thinking has taken place since
the mid-1980s. The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 is
representative of this push for modernization and the concept of military
restructuring and rethinking currently taking place in the Department of
Defense. One of the overriding intents of this legislation is to enhance the
military's ability to accomplish tactical missions by refocusing strategy,
contingency planning and execution in a low-intensity conflict (LIC) arena.
The establishment of the unified command, United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM), in April 1987 is evidence of this intent.
While the Marine Corps maintains its unique character as "soldiers from
the sea" and "a force in readiness," with a primary mission to continue the
prosecution of a naval campaign, the Corps has also sought to establish a sea-
based, LIC strategy and doctrine. The Marines have replaced the term
"amphibious" with "expeditionary" when referring to their fighting forces.
Using the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) organizational concept,
they have created special operations capable Marine Expeditionary Units
(MEU(SOC)s). The MEU(SOC) is advertised as a naval power projection force
possessing the widest variety of capabilities to meet the uncertainties and
challenges of today's fluid threat environment. The Commandant of the
Marine Corps, General A. M. Gray, has stated in his analysis of the changing
world that, "It is the Third World, the so-called low-intensity conflict arena,
where we are most likely to be committed this decade." He said this in 1986,
but it is even more true today considering the crumbling of the Berlin Wall,
the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and the effective end of the Cold War.
Although the threat of conventional war with the Soviet Union is greatly
reduced, the challenges posed by "conflicts short of war" have arguably
grown. In the 1990s, it is likely to be the North-South tensions (disparities
between the industrialized rich countries in the Northern hemisphere versus
the Third World countries in the Southern hemisphere) that could be the
greatest threat to world order. Considering its small size, the Marine Corps
has focused on LIC and expeditionary combat as its forte.
B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE
Intelligence drives operations.
General A.M. Gray,
Commandant of the Marine Corps
(M. C. Intelligence Conf., Sept., 1987)
A critical link exists between operational missions and required
intelligence. Since intelligence data does little good if it is not tailored to the
operational requirements of the specific situation, the essence of the
intelligence officer's job is to provide operational intelligence support and
assist the tactical commanders in implementing their operational plans.
Establishing a generic list or baseline of intelligence requirements within the
context of "war as it really is" is an essential step for future analysis of an
intelligence architecture that meets the IRs.
In view of today's fast-paced, multi-threat environment, the ability of a
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander to effectively receive
and disseminate combat and tactical intelligence to higher, adjacent, and
subordinate forces is critical in ensuring knowledgeable decisions to support
successful mission completion. It is therefore paramount that the
intelligence support system /network be reliable, responsive, and simply
connected. Such a connected network assists the commander in
implementing his operational plans, particularly in a special operations/low-
intensity conflict (SO/LIC) environment. It is in this capacity that
connectivity of intelligence overlaps with mission execution.
The purpose of this thesis is to reveal the fundamental uniform
intelligence requirements of Marines in conflict, as a functional area of
uniform operational requirements. The thesis then portrays the essence of
the current Marine Corps command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, and interoperability (C4I2) system and underlying principles of
the organizations, doctrines, and technologies of an intelligence architecture.
Chapter II considers LIC as the future environment and examines
particular military roles. What aspects of LIC are most important to Marines?
Are there certain requirements Marines can expect to fill? How must
intelligence support be tailored to satisfy the Marine commander's essential
mission planning and execution tasks? The National Command Authority
(NCA) has historically chosen an Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) with a
Marine battalion landing team (BLT) as its core unit to conduct peacekeeping
and peacetime contingency operations. There are basic operational and
intelligence support issues which establish themselves time and time again.
II. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
One senior U.S. diplomat remarked that in low-intensity conflict as in
real estate, there are only three things that matter. In real estate, these
are location, location, location; in low-intensity conflict they are
intelligence, intelligence, intelligence.
General Paul F. Gorman, USA
(Gorman, 1990, p. 117)
Dozens of books, volumes of articles and other exploratory and
explanatory research on the subject of LIC have been written. Authors and
doctrinal publications continue to focus on the Marine Corps' role in this
area. Major Richard Hobbs, USMC, focused his Master's Thesis on the subject
at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in May 1988, by asking
the important question: "Are we prepared to fight in the low-intensity
conflict environment?" (Hobbs, 1988, p. 110) He identified LIC in terms of
"operations short of war" and "small wars." Hobbs concluded that while there
is no cookbook formula for LIC and fighting in it, flexible application of both
political and military means are required. The fundamental distinction
between LIC's unconventional nature and more conventional conflicts is that
"the key characteristic is one of people and not terrain." (Hobbs, 1988, pp. 103-
104) Intelligence has a unique and critical role in an environment where
conventional combat is carefully avoided by the enemy. Knowing and
understanding one's enemy comes down to primarily superior human
intelligence collection and analysis, vice national technical means. The
operational intelligence support to a small war must be made for the lower
echelons of command. Also, success in this environment is dependent upon
the commander's mental capacity and character to respond in an
unstructured ambiguous environment.
All the literature suggests that the United States has tremendous
difficulty defining LIC and its role in unconventional warfare. This problem
of definition is compounded by the fact that though the U.S. has fought
contingencies in the Third World, it has never focused and built an
intelligence capability to exploit that area. This chapter will explore LIC and
examine the operational roles for which the Marines must prepare.
A. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Third World countries have been the location of nearly all conflicts
requiring a U. S. response since World War II. These conflicts have included
insurgency, counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare, insurrection, border
friction, coup d'etat and, more recently, international terrorism and narcotics
trafficking. President Ronald Reagan encompassed these in the President's
Report to Congress on U.S. Capabilities to Engage in Low-Intensity Conflict
and Conduct Special Operations, February 1988. He identified low-intensity
conflict as:
the political-military confrontation between contending states or groups
at a level below conventional war but above routine peaceful
competition among states. It involves protracted struggles of competing
principles and ideologies, and its manifestations range from subversion
to the use of armed forces. It is waged by a combination of political,
economic, international and military instruments. These conflicts are
often in the Third World, but can contain regional and global security
implications. 1
Quoted by the Joint Chief of Staff in JCS message 1114122, February 1988,
amending JCS Pub. 1 from the unpublished classified document President's
The Armed Forces are using this definition to guide their doctrine and
publications on the subject of LIC.
The President's National Security Strategy of the United States 1988
identified LIC as a particularly troublesome form of instability that provides
"fertile ground for unrest and for groups and nations wishing to exploit
unrest for their own purposes." This type of conflict threatens the United
States when it assaults our national interests, security, values, political
foundations, friends and allies. (The White House, 1988, p. 34) It appears the
U.S. can expect that the chronic political and economic instabilities of the
poorer nations of the globe will continue to cause an ambiguous, protracted
predicament of neither conventional war nor peace. These may be fueled by
the revolutionary left, the radical right, internal ethnic hostility or some
other condition. (Sloan, 1990, p. 42)
B. MILITARY REQUIREMENTS OF LIC
Hobbs outlined four basic military missions requirements of LIC: Foreign
Internal Defense (FID); terrorism counteraction; peacekeeping operations; and
peacetime contingency operations. These are also found in U.S. Army Field
Circular 100-20 Low-Intensity Conflict, (1986). Foreign Internal Defense is
participation by civilian and military agencies of the U.S. to help a friendly
government "free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and
insurgency." (Hobbs, 1988, p. 69) This includes security assistance or mobile
training teams to advise and train local forces. FID is what is going on in El
Salvador today and is the likely U.S. response to insurgency. Terrorism
Report to Congress on U.S. Capabilities to Engage in Low-Intensity Conflict
and Conduct Special Operations.
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counteraction involves the use of specially trained military units striking
terrorists before and after they act (Hobbs, 1988, p. 71). Achille Lauro, 1985 best
fits this description. Peacekeeping operations are the introduction of military
forces to achieve peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. The two types
are cease-fire operations or law and order maintenance (Hobbs, 1988, p. 71).
Beirut, 1982-84, is the obvious example of this. Peacetime contingency
operations "are politically sensitive military operations characterized by the
short term rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of
war, e.g., strike, raid, rescue, recovery, demonstration, show of force,
noncombatant evacuation, unconventional warfare and intelligence
operations." (Hobbs, 1988, p. 72) Others have called this expeditionary combat
operations (Bolger, 1988, p. 12). Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, Director of
Naval Intelligence, has labeled these as contingency and limited objective
(CALO) operations (Brooks, 1991, p. 2). They encompass most of the military
responses the U.S. has used, including the intelligence collection operations
in the counter-narcotics war.
Some of these operations require a great deal of special training, others
less so. Regardless, all combat forces in LIC must have the ability to arrive on
the scene quickly, adapt to the unstructured operating environment, and
accomplish their mission while restrained by unusual rules of engagement.
(McMahon, 1990, p. 5). The political considerations (both national and
international) and sensitivity of these operations often require a less visible
military presence constrained in various regards.
Recent literature indicates that guerrilla warfare is no longer the likely
LIC requiring a U.S. military response. In a March 1989 RAND study,
Revolutions without Guerrillas, J. D. Simon concluded that it is the threats to
world stability caused by a "combination of political, social, economic and
ethnic-religious forces in urban centers" which proliferate the LIC
environment today, rather than guerrilla warfare and rural insurgencies
(Simon, 1989, p. v). Evidence of this is that the U.S. has not been required to
conduct counterinsurgency with any significant numbers since Vietnam.
This is not to suggest that the U.S. should not develop military doctrine for
combating insurgencies, but that it should focus on the more likely crisis
scenarios and prioritize intelligence support efforts for those conflicts.
Bernard F. McMahon has offered a succinct list of U.S. military
requirements that fit this newest definition of LIC in the 1990s. LIC missions
for which the United States would require combat capabilities include:
• Forcible hostage rescue (such as Desert One and the Mayaguez
operation);
• Evacuation of U.S. officials or nationals from hostile situations in
foreign territories (Beirut, 1976);
• Preemptive strikes against terrorists planning to commit violent
acts, or retaliatory strikes once a terrorist attack occurs (Libya, 1986);
• Support of law enforcement authorities in the forcible
apprehension of known terrorists or other international fugitives
(the FBI apprehension of Fawaz Yunis);
• Armed escort to U.S.-flagged ships in combat zones (the Persian
Gulf reflagging operation);
• Protection of U.S. property in foreign lands, particularly U.S.
embassies, when local authorities prove inadequate or disinclined
(deployment of U.S. military reinforcements to bases in Panama,
1987-89);
• Interdiction of armed narcotics traffickers (the recent promise by
the Bush Administration to provide military support to the
Colombian government if asked);
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• Combat operations against insurgents in host countries unable to
provide adequate protection to U.S. nationals (U.S. military
advisers in El Salvador, 1982
—);
• Combat operations against violators of cease-fires during U.S.
participation in peacekeeping operations (Beirut, 1983);
• Limited strikes by U.S. general purpose forces or strikes by special
operations forces to protect U.S. security interests (the invasion of
Grenada). (McMahon, 1990, p. 4)
Using these examples, the utility of the military in LIC may not always be
dear, but it is a fact. A ruthless focus must be made to determine what special
requirements are there for a unit to be able to function operationally in LIC.
The Marine Corps as a conventional amphibious force has an inherent
and historically proven capability to perform many of these missions.
Chapter HI will investigate war as it really is to Marines. First, where have
Marines been since 1945? Then, five significant cases in which the Marines
have been militarily employed are examined. The five historical antecedents
of Marines in LIC prove that there are operational links and basic
uniformities of organization, doctrine, and intelligence requirements that can
be drawn over time.
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III. WAR AS IT REALLY IS TO THE MARINE CORPS
One of the more useful and powerful methods for assessing the
operational requirements of the Marine Corps is to base that assessment on
where and how this country has really required its Marine Corps to respond.
Five key historical cases are examined to ferret out these operational
uniformities. Since 1945, Marines have operated almost exclusively in what
is called LIC. The historical antecedents of actual military requirements
provide a baseline of operational characteristics which show a link between
missions and required intelligence. Here is a nearly complete list of where
Marines have been since 1945:
• 1945-50: China; disarm/repatriate 630,000 Japanese.
• 1950-53: Korean War.
• 1953: Greek Islands; battalion 2/6 rescued earthquake victims;
Peacetime Contingency Operation.
• 1954: Guatemala; During U.S.-supported coup against the government
of Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, battalion 2/8 stood by to protect
American citizens /property; Peacetime Contingency Operation.
• 1955: Battalion helped evacuate 26,000 Chinese from mainland to
Taiwan; Peacetime Contingency Operation.
• 1956: Alexandria, Egypt and Haifa, Israel; Battalion 3/2 evacuated U.S.
nationals from Egypt and a U.N. truce team from Israel during the
Suez crisis; Peacetime Contingency Operation.
• 1957: Indonesia; 3rd Marines stood by during an Indonesian revolt;
Peacetime Contingency Operation.
• 1958: Lebanon; Peacekeeping Operation.
• 1961: Turkey; 3rd MEB landed a show of force to deter external
communist pressure; Peacetime Contingency Operation.
• 1965-72: Vietnam; 3/9 was the first Marine BLT ashore.
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1965: Dominican Republic; Peacetime Contingency Operation.
1975: Koh Tang, Cambodia; battalion 2/9 attempted hostage rescue and
recovery of the Mayaguez; Peacetime Contingency Operation.
1976: Beirut, Lebanon; 34th MAU (BLT 1/8) conducted Peacetime
Contingency Operation (NEO).
1982-84: Lebanon; Peacekeeping Operation.
1983: Grenada; Peacetime Contingency Operation.
1989: Panama; Peacetime Contingency Operation/Invasion.
1990: Liberia; Peacetime Contingency Operation (NEO).
1990: Somalia; Peacetime Contingency Operation (NEO).
1990-91: Kuwait; 90,000 Marines deployed in response to Iraqi invasion.
Except for Korea, parts of Vietnam, and Kuwait, all these missions have
been in the LIC environment. It is obvious the threat environment has been
the Third World arena. Out of the 19 examples, 15 of the missions have been
peacekeeping operations and peacetime contingency operations.
Additionally, it has been a BLT debarking from amphibious ships which has
conducted most ground operations.
The remainder of this chapter will examine the uniformities of a Marine
BLT conducting peacekeeping operations or peacetime contingency
operations. Those were the criteria used for choosing the following five
prevalent cases since 1945: 1) Lebanon 1958; 2) Dominican Republic 1965; 3)
Lebanon 1982-84; 4) Grenada 1983; and 5) Liberia 1990.2
2Time and space prohibit looking at all cases in detail. The most
questionable examples which I might be accused of leaving out are Vietnam
1965-69 and Panama 1989. However, they do not fit the typical size unit, a
BLT.
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A. LEBANON, 1958: OPERATION BLUEBAT
In 1958, Operation BLUEBAT was the largest U.S. military operation since
Korea. The mission was essentially to keep the peace in a country split by
external, Arab-supported revolution. In May, 1958, tensions erupted into
armed insurrection against the Lebanese President, Camille Chamoun.
Externally, Syria had extensive armored forces poised on the border for an
invasion; internally, diverse Moslem and Christian religious groups were
violently opposing one another in maneuvers for self-protection and internal
political hegemony.
The decisive warning "tip" to the U.S. government for possible U.S.
intervention came from Chamoun himself in May in the form of an appeal
to the United Nations for diplomatic pressure on Syria and to the U.S. for
standby aid. No significant increase in U.S. intelligence collection on the
brewing problem was initiated other than using diplomatic monitoring. Task
Forces 61 and 62, the Navy and Marine amphibious elements of the Sixth
Fleet, began to prepare for possible landings in the Middle East. The U.S.
decision for a crisis intervention was based on a surprise event on 14 July,
1958. The king of Iraq was murdered in a forcible coup d'etat, leaving
Lebanon as the only Arab nation with strong Western ties. (Shulimson, 1983,
p. 7) This event greatly challenged any remaining stability of the Lebanese
government and peace in the Middle East.
On 14 July President Eisenhower directed the JCS to issue the warning
order to land forces in Lebanon on 15 July "to support the legal Lebanese
government against any foreign invasion," specifically against the Syrians,
only a few hours away. Later that day the order to land was specified for 1500
14
15 July. Time was the critical factor in all mission planning at that point.
Admiral J.L. Holloway, Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic
and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) had designated Brigadier General S.S.
Wade, USMC, as Sixth Fleet landing force commander for the mission.
(Shulimson, 1983, p. 8)
Wade was the first to sense the extreme ambiguity of the mission and
situation in Lebanon. In a 1959 article he stated, "Although not an actual
combat situation, it was a true test of many of our present concepts and
techniques...." (Wade, 1959, p. 10) The selection of H-hour was determined
more by political and less by tactical considerations; the problem of
conducting an operation on such short notice was that the three BLTs of the
Marine Force were not in position to land quickly. Not knowing whether it
would meet any opposition, BLT 2/2 was landed with the assumption that it
would be able to cope with whatever might develop. Possible threats
included rebel resistance groups numbering approximately 10,000, a Syrian
Army composed of 40,000 men and associated armor, and the possible
disintegration of the Lebanese Army into opposing factions. (Shulimson,
1983, p. 12) Fortunately, BLT 2/2 found no enemy opposition, but bikini-clad
sunbathers; no armor, but soft drink carts. The primary objective—Beirut
International Airport—was secured within an hour. (Wade, 1959, p. 13)
The political-military situation in Lebanon was very complex. The point
of contact became U.S. Ambassador McClintock, who related that the
Lebanese Army commander, General Chehab, did not want the Marines
ashore. McClintock also relied heavily on his naval attache to provide liaison
between Lebanese and U.S. military units. It became apparent that no
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political or military body in Lebanon was in stable control of its own
existence. There were threats on President Chamoun's life, to the extent that
Marines were asked to protect him. Chehab had to personally guarantee the
safety of his President. Choosing to firmly back the Chamoun government
and forming a mutually supportive understanding with Chehab proved to be
one of the wisest operational decisions the Marines made. Ironically, a U.N.
observer suggested that the Marines were backing the wrong side of the
conflict, but that was dismissed by the BLT 2/2 Commander. (Shulimson,
1983, p. 16)
On 16 July, BLT 3/6 landed across the beach at the airport and relieved
BLT 2/2. BLT 2/2 continued on to Beirut with guidance to keep a low profile
and allow the Lebanese Army to always remain between them and any rebel
factions. In effect, the Lebanese Army was protecting the U.S. forces, despite
their lack of will in dealing with the rebels prior to U.S. intervention. The
close liaison between the U.S. and Lebanese forces allowed for a visibly
cohesive operation. This had a strong psychological effect on the Lebanese
civilians. (Wade, 1959, p. 15)
By 31 July, Chehab was elected President of Lebanon and the U.S. Army
had arrived and assumed command of what was now a joint operation. On
14 August, BLT 2/2 reembarked on Sixth Fleet ships. As it turned out, 16 July
was the highpoint of Operation BLUEBAT. Subsequent operations were
confined to holding operations. (Shulimson, 1983, p. 42)
The operational characteristics of Operation BLUEBAT can be
summarized as follows:
• Political considerations caused a time-compressed environment and
dominated tactical concerns.
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• BLT 2/2 landed without the logistics and fire support available on
other ships. This was a deep concern since Syrian tanks were three
hours away.
• The conflict was ambiguous, but the commanders found that their
objectives must be decisively pursued.
• The Marines had to negotiate for objectives rather than seize them.
• The peacekeeping operation required extreme discipline. Every Marine
had to suppress his trained tendency to enter conflict aggressively and
violently. No friendly casualties resulted from the operation.
The operations of Marines in Lebanon, 1958, from a perspective of
intelligence support to the tactical level, can be summarized as:
• Time-compression from warning order to execution order also greatly
hindered the intelligence support to BLT 2/2.
• No beach reconnaissance was done, which resulted in unanticipated
difficulties in the initial /critical landing on 15 July.
• The estimate of the enemy size, strength, and disposition was virtually
lacking for 2/2.
• The complexity of the political-military structure of Lebanon proved
tough to figure out, even when 2/2 arrived. Ultimately, political and
socio-cultural intelligence was missed more than traditional military
intelligence.
• Human intelligence (HUMINT) available from liaison with the
embassy personnel and subsequently from the Lebanese Army proved
to be the most useful type of intelligence. A pre-landing liaison with
the Embassy would have reduced much of the initial ambiguity.
HUMINT collection against the various rebel and religious factions
was the primary means toward sorting out the nature of the enemy.
Basic patrolling by combined and unilateral forces told a lot also.
• Two fundamental problems were the lack of linguists and up-to-date
maps. As BGEN Wade pointed out in 1959: Using local personnel as
interpreters in the political turmoil in Lebanon emphasized a need
within the Marine Corps for qualified linguists to be available for
employment with "brush fire" forces in all areas of possible
commitment (Wade, 1959, p. 17).
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B. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1965: OPERATION POWER PACK
American intelligence reported in early 1965 that two dissident groups
may attempt a coup against the civilian junta government of the Dominican
Republic. Despite agreements with the Organization of American States
(OAS) not to intervene in Latin American countries without consulting it,
the U.S. responded militarily in April 1965 to a revolt centered in the capital,
Santo Domingo. The revolt appeared to present a serious threat to the safety
of thousands of foreign nationals in the city.
On 24 April, with the U.S. Ambassador in the U.S. and the U.S. Naval
Attache out of Santo Domingo, a coup was initiated against the ruling-group
government led by Donald Reid Cabral. President Reid quit and Santo
Domingo was found in a state of anarchy due to various mobs and political
parties vying for freedom and power. With inherent suspicion of a
communist-led party seizing power, on 25 April President Lyndon Johnson
authorized a contingency operation by CINC Atlantic to protect 1,200
American lives and property. There was a subsequent mission to ensure
communists did not gain political control.
The ARG (Task Group 44.9) and 6th MEU arrived on station off the coast
of Santo Domingo early on 26 April. The number of evacuees grew to 3,000.
The American Embassy alerted U.S. citizens to prepare for evacuation and
designated the largest hotel in Santo Domingo as the assembly point for
evacuation from the Haina pier. On 27 April, unarmed elements of BLT 3/6
began the evacuation by boarding evacuees onto U.S. Navy ships tied
pierside. The town was filled with rebels who were establishing various
strongholds and the American Embassy was urging a "somewhat friendly"
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military junta to take control of the Dominican Republic government. The
military junta asked for the U.S. to help restore peace in the country and this
changed the nature of the operation.
On 28 April, more than 500 Marines of BLT 3/6 began coming ashore
under combat conditions by helicopter. On the 29th the ARG and MEU
commanders met with the Ambassador to evaluate the situation firsthand,
and found that the rebels where expanding their operations. The rest of 3/6
came ashore at the Haina pier with heavy equipment on the 30th; on the
same day two U.S. Army airborne battalions landed.
Military necessity now took precedence over political restraint. Within
two weeks 22,000 American troops were on the ground to: 1) protect
American lives; 2) halt political and street violence by enforcing a cease-fire;
3) stop a communist takeover; and 4) provide the opportunity for free
elections. The U.S. intervention lasted eighteen months.
From the Marine Corps' perspective the operation exploited the
expeditionary flexibility of forward deployed, sea-based, sustainable power
projection forces into a multi-faceted mission environment. The operational
characteristics of Operation POWER PACK are summarized as:
• The BLT was required to operate under rapidly changing and
sometimes conflicting mission requirements. The mission changed
from an evacuation to a stability operation.
• Command and control from ship to shore was a serious problem
which required the aid of a ham radio operator and equipment. This
required extensive face-to-face meetings between all U.S. parties and
exhaustive liaison efforts with the new junta to gain operational
information.
• Sniper fire was the greatest threat to the Marine force.
• The mission became a joint mission after two weeks.
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A basic list of intelligence issues for the operational support of the
Marines is:
• The primary source of intelligence was the American Embassy, which
had the least convoluted picture of the political-military situation.
• Open HUMINT sources provided the most useful information. Much
of the essential information was acquired by Marines through contact
with the Dominicans once the Marines were ashore.
• Unfortunately, little current information existed on the identity,
disposition, location, and intentions of the various political factions
existing in the Dominican Republic. Intelligence was lacking on the
key facilities used, such as the Embassy, main hotel, Haina pier, and
potential aircraft landing zones. Some intelligence information was
withheld from operational commanders because of an obsession with
operational security. (Yates, 1988, p. 176)
• Inaccurate maps caused Marines to stray into rebel territory.
• The lack of Spanish linguists prevented immediate and smooth
interaction with friendly and opposition forces.
• Aerial reconnaissance missions excessively took 12 hours for mission
turn around to acquire imagery intelligence (IMINT).
• Despite technological advantages, signal intercept operations did not
work against the rebels' hand-held, Japanese-made radios. A special
intelligence communications net had to be deployed to Dominican
Republic to exploit what signal intelligence (SIGINT) was possible.
• There was a great need for extensive Civil Affairs and Psychological
Warfare capabilities, as the main thrust of the U.S. effort became
focused on the political-economic-sociological fields (Director of
Marine Corps History, 1970, p. 70).
C LEBANON, 1982-84
No single military mission cost more American lives since Vietnam than
that of peacekeeping by Marines in Beirut, Lebanon. On 23 October, 1983, a
suicide bombing attack by a single terrorist killed 241 Americans, of whom 220
were Marines. For Marines, this was the highest loss of life in a single day
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since D-Day on Iwo Jima 1945 (Frank, 1987, p. 3). Due to instantaneous
worldwide media attention to the event and ultimate mission failure,
analysts tended to focus only on that one part of the Marines' time in
Lebanon.
Violence surrounding numerous political and religious rivalries, both
internally and externally generated, and international efforts to alleviate it
had been going on in Beirut ever since BLT 2/2 landed there in July 1958.
Political-military-social stability had never existed for long. In June 1982,
Lebanon became the fighting ground for the Israeli Defense Force against the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syrian forces. The Israelis had
surrounded Beirut in an effort to finally neutralize the PLO bastioned there.
On 15 June, the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), centered on BLT
2/8 as the Ground Combat Element (GCE), was placed on a three hour alert
100 miles off the coast of Lebanon. Its mission was to evacuate American
citizens from Lebanon. The order to execute came on 24 June and 580
noncombatant evacuees were taken, without incident, by landing craft from
the port city of Juniyah to amphibious ships. The MAU remained in the area
for possible subsequent contingency operations.
On 25 August 1982, at the request of the Lebanese government, U.S.,
French, and Italian military units formed a Multinational Force to supervise
the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut. BLT 2/8 was to secure the port of
Beirut in conjunction with the Lebanese Armed Forces. With all forces
under arms and very excited, the PLO evacuation began on the 25th and
ended on 3 September. On 10 September, the 32d MAU left Lebanon for the
second time and the peacekeeping mission was considered a huge success.
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On 14 September, the Lebanese president-elect Bashir Gemayel was
assassinated. On 16 September, a massacre of Palestinian refugees occurred in
West Beirut. On 29 September, the 32d MAU and BLT 2/8 returned to begin
the now contested, eighteen month mission to provide "... a presence in
Beirut, that would in turn help establish the stability necessary for the
Lebanese government to regain control of their capital. The mission required
the 32d MAU to occupy positions in the vicinity of Beirut International
Airport and establish and maintain close continuous liaison with the French,
Italian, and Lebanese forces." (Frank, 1987, p. 23) The mission was
diplomatically driven and was not tactical in nature. The Multinational
Force's presence was supposed to have a stabilizing effect on the political
morass surrounding the government of Lebanon.
The airport area, which BLT 2/8 was to secure, was in the midst of an area
populated by Shiite Muslims who had close religious ties with Iran and
venerated the Ayatolla Khomeini. The force faced the threats of terrorism
and a considerable number of unexploded munitions, left from heavy
fighting. To do the job, the MEU requested and received extra combat
engineer, interrogator /translator, explosive ordnance disposal, public affairs,
preventive medicine, fire support, and intelligence detachments.
During the lengthy presence/peacekeeping mission units changed but
they never were larger than a MAU size (1,500 Marines and sailors). On 30
October, the 24th MAU (BLT 3/8) replaced the 32d MAU (BLT 2/8) in place at
the airport. In February 1983, 22d MAU (BLT 2/6) replaced the 24th MAU.
Due to political considerations, many tactical concerns were neglected
such as occupying certain key high ground around the airport. Other
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incidents arose. On 2 February, 1983 a Marine captain used a pistol to preven
three Israeli tanks from passing through a joint U.S.-Lebanese checkpoint. Or
15 March, 1983 an Italian patrol was ambushed by unknown terrorists. On 1*
C March, a BLT 2/6 patrol was "terrorized" by a lone hand grenade. In April
k c
q the American Embassy was bombed by a terrorist driving a van; 63 people
IC C
were killed. This incident added the mission of security to the earlier missior
l( C
'qs of presence/peacekeeping. In May, artillery rounds landed for the first tim<
inside the Marines' position, and 24th MAU (BLT 1/8) relieved 22d MAI
(BLT 2/6). During July and August, the Marines came under the heavies
artillery and rocket fire to date. They were described by many as sitting ducki
(Frank, 1987, pp. 58, 64, 75, 80). The intelligence indications warned th(
Marines that they were targeted by terrorists (Frank, 1987, pp. 74, 78, 92)
HUMINT from Lebanese contacts indicated a large bomb had been movec
into Beirut 4 to 5 days ahead of time in preparation for bombing the Marine
compound. The information never got to the Marine commander
HUMINT was not cycled and fused aggressively enough and the politica
presence mission retained strict rules of engagement such that personal anc
unit defenses were not improved. On 23 October the bombing occurred ir
Beirut.
On 19 November, the 22d MAU relieved the 24th MAU. Until It
(5 4 February the 22d MAU (BLT 2/8) responded much more vigorously to al
9 ( direct attacks from the various factions opposing them in Beirut. They dug ir
deeper than before and used deception techniques to protect themselves
Offensively, for the first time, the 16-inch guns of the USS New Jersey wer<
used to respond to enemy indirect fire. In February 1984, the 22d MAU begai
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evacuation operations of more than 700 Americans, and by the 26th the MAU
left Beirut having failed in keeping the peace.
The operational fundamentals can be summarized as:
• Political and diplomatic considerations took precedence over military
and tactical requirements.
• The missions changed fluidly and required Marines to be employed in
a variety of limited and precarious ways.
• Differing from Lebanon 1958, the Marines were trying not to overtly
assist the Lebanese Army because it made them cross the line of
neutrality; at the same time, they had a mission to train Lebanese
armed forces.
• The rules of engagement (ROE) were very restrictive and allowed very
few Marines to have loaded weapons against ambiguous threats which
all had "loaded weapons" and few self-imposed restrictions.
• Patrolling became the primary means to exhibit a presence, but became
routine and self-defensive rather than offensive in nature as did the
necessity for hundreds of thousands of sandbags and static checkpoints.
• All operations demanded the greatest of personal discipline by
Marines.
Some key intelligence issues were:
• There was no updated port and beach study for Beirut which inhibited
the Marines' initial NEO and PLO escort missions.
• There was a need for target intelligence against indirect fire assets of the
various threats. They were not localized and identified in a timely
manner for neutralization.
• Political and cultural intelligence was critical and needed to be fused to
tactical military intelligence.
• There was no one conduit for the sharing of information from all the
U.S. and foreign services.
• Counterintelligence and counter-terrorism predominated the
intelligence effort.
• There was a need for a number of qualified linguists in French, Italian,
and various dialects of Arabic.
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• Primarily, HUMINT was required to sort out the depth of the politico-
military factions operating in the urban Lebanon environment.
Lebanese police and intelligence sources provided the best HUMINT.
• There was a tremendous amount of intelligence material available
over time which necessitated a larger intelligence section on shore to
assess the threat once it was perceived.
The Long Commission investigation into the 23 October barracks
bombing concluded that the Marines in Beirut were not provided timely
intelligence tailored to their specific needs in defending against the full
spectrum of threats. The commission's fundamental recommendation was
for the establishment of an intelligence fusion center which would tailor and
focus "... all-source intelligence support to U.S. military commanders
involved in military operations in areas of high threat, conflict, or crisis." The
Commission also recommended that the CIA and DoD establish ways to
immediately improve HUMINT support. (Long Commission Report, 1983,
pp. 136-137)
D. GRENADA, 1983: OPERATION URGENT FURY
On 25 October, 1983, a combined force of U.S. Marines and Rangers,
followed by 750 paratroopers and an Eastern Caribbean multinational force of
300 men, stormed ashore on the island of Grenada. It was variously called a
rescue operation, an effort to restore order and democracy, a noncombatant
evacuation operation, and an invasion. The operation was in response to a
request from Grenada's Governor General Sir Paul Scoon to restore the
opportunity for democracy and to remove the threat of a Soviet/Cuban-
sponsored revolutionary communist party takeover. There were also 1,000
U.S. citizens, mostly medical students, who were possible hostage targets.
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On 18 October, the 22d MAU (BLT 2/8) was en route from North Carolina
to Beirut to relieve the 24th MAU (BLT 1/8). On 22 October it was ordered to
sail south toward Grenada. Without much guidance, the tactical
commanders had the impression their likely mission was a NEO. That
mission changed to: 1) protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign
nationals; 2) neutralize Grenadian forces; 3) stabilize the internal situation;
and 4) maintain the peace. The ARG/MEU received its mission order on 23
October. With less than 30 hours until H-hour, the BLT and aviation
squadron began planning for the missions of seizing the Pearls Airport and
the port of Grenville, and of neutralizing any opposing force in the area.
(Spector, 1987, p. 5)
There was a real dearth of information about Grenada available for
planning; there were no tactical ground maps and the single nautical chart
available used 1936 data. The primary landing plan had to be changed within
an hour of execution from a surface assault to a heliborne assault as a result of
beach reconnaissance by the SEALs. Aerial photos of the landing zones
proved misleading as palm trees and marshy soil inhibited the landings. One
surprise during the operation was the local populace, which welcomed the
Marines to the point of identifying members of militia and Army. Locals
even guided Marines into the countryside to capture caches of weapons.
The U.S. Army Rangers had more opposition in conducting their assault
and a company of Marines and four helicopter gunships had to be dispatched
to help. Most operations involving Marines and soldiers were done without
direct communications due to interoperability problems and no advanced
coordination. The overall result was that Marine and Army units were
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unaware of their close proximity to each other. By 2 November the Marines
were reembarked and on their way to Lebanon for another type of operation.
URGENT FURY had these operational characteristics from the Marine
Corps perspective:
• It was a peacetime contingency executed in a "no time for detailed
planning" environment. Apparently, the choice by national
decisionmakers for operational security prevented the ARG/MEU
from being informed of any details of the operation as they became
available.
• It was a fully joint operation by forces with different operational styles.
Unfortunately, the commanders spent almost half of their time dealing
with higher authorities to give and get operational information.
Operation URGENT FURY, like Lebanon, was closely examined by many
analysts for "lessons learned." Some of the key issues of intelligence support
are:
• The intelligence estimates given Marines were oversimplified and
wrong. Operational intelligence reports overestimated the strength but
underestimated the fighting spirit of Grenadian forces. The Cuban
forces were underestimated in both numbers and will to fight.
(Metcalf, 1986, p. 284)
• Tactical intelligence collected by the warfighters themselves is what
guided the operations. This tactical data was from radio monitoring of
Cuban transmissions, HUMINT gathered from locals and detainees,
and organic ground and air reconnaissance.
• A large intelligence failure was determined to be the lack of common
maps and charts of the operating area. On 2 November, as Marines
were leaving the area, new charts from the Defense Mapping Agency
were made available.
• Finally, there was little evidence of national HUMINT to support the
operation (Metcalf, 1986, p. 296). In this type of conflict environment
HUMINT collection needs were greater than technical collection needs.
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E LIBERIA, 1990: OPERATION SHARP EDGE
In May of 1990, the 22d MEU(SOC) "changed operational procedures and
control" from the Atlantic Fleet to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea in
Toulon, France. On 25 May the ARG/MEU received a Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) deployment order through Sixth Fleet to prepare for a NEO in
Monrovia, the capital of Liberia. (Command Element, 22d MEU(SOC), 1990)
The civil war-torn country was on the verge of collapse as ten-year
President Samuel K. Doe's government and military were under siege from
two separate rebel groups. Since December 1989, 10,000 lives had been lost in
the internal conflict. (Michaels, 1990, p. 62)
With the initial tasking, the ARG/MEU task organized a Special Purpose
Force, embarked it on a faster Navy destroyer, and deployed it to Liberia. A
few days later the ARG with the remainder of the MEU arrived. Loitering
unobtrusively off the coast, the force gained additional intelligence and
coordinated with the American Ambassador. (Gray, 1991, p. 12) On 5 August,
1990, while the rest of the world watched the larger Operation DESERT
SHIELD, a reinforced rifle company (237 Marines) provided security to the
American Embassy and evacuated 62 American citizens from outlying
communications sites. During the course of six months 2,400 American
citizens and foreign nationals were evacuated. There was never a need to
intervene in the Liberian conflict.
The key characteristics of Operation SHARP EDGE can be summarized as:
• Uncertainty in planning;
• Limited military objectives;
• The ultimate care of civilians, U.S. property and maintenance of order;
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• The timing of the operation was not a military decision as much as
political;
• The actual size of the landing force was not determined until the "11th
hour";
• The duration of the execution of the operation depended on the hostile
threat to various civilians, nationalities, and locations.
There were two basic issues of intelligence support for Operation SHARP
EDGE:
• A considerable amount of organic and external intelligence collection
and analytical resources was dedicated to a relatively small force and
objective area;
• Embassy personnel and advanced party personnel provided the most
useful political intelligence, indicating HUMINT was a critical means
of collection, and development of the operational situation occurs
ashore.
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IV. UNIFORMITIES IN MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS IN LIC
A. A MODEL OF THE FUTURE
From the foregoing discussion there is empirical reason to believe that
the next warning order given by NCA/JCS to a Marine Corps unit will be a
military requirement to conduct a peacetime contingency or peacekeeping
operation. It will be in an ambiguous Third World threat environment. The
Marines' operating force structure will be centered on a battalion landing
team as the ground combat element (a MEU(SOC) in today's jargon). The
MEU(SOC) will of course exploit the flexibility of being forward deployed, sea-
based, and self-sustainable in maintaining a limited presence ashore. It will
be poised to operate independently in response to crisis situations when time
does not allow deployment of a larger force, or in coordination with the
deployment of forces from CONUS or other theaters of operation should the
operation require an early joint response. There are a variety of situations
and environments in which the MEU must be prepared to operate.
The MEU and Naval Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) of about four
ships will conduct their planning en route to the objective prior to the
assault. There will be a time-compressed planning and execution
environment. This will have certain ramifications on the ability to
command and control, and to gather required intelligence. Aggravating this
already difficult situation is the fact that the amphibious force may shift from
one theater commander's control to another's. Additionally, the Marine
element is under naval control afloat and Marine control once it is
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established ashore, where the expeditionary force will largely be on its own
once it is committed.
The tactical commanders of the ARG/MEU will first require the most up-
to-date maps and charts of the area of operation (AO). Wide area imagery
coverage of the AO and recent point imagery of specific areas will be desired.
If there are facilities and installations such as ports, airfields, embassies, and
urban areas that are to be occupied, the commanders will want even more
detailed maps, photos, and textual explanation. All products are expected to
be accurate and up-to-date. The commanders must have an accurate idea of
friendly and opposing military and political capabilities and intentions. This
intelligence will be a compilation of textual database and recent HUMINT,
IMINT, and SIGINT. Reasonably, the commander will want to have "eyes
and ears on the target" before putting forces in, to enable more flexibility in
planning and using surprise and timing to his advantage.
Basically, when forces go ashore they want to "know it all" and travel
light. The commander believes that to get in and out of the conflict
environment as fast as possible is likely the best way to both accomplish the
mission and save sailors' and Marines' lives.
This scenario is a reasonable one given the circumstances which keep
recurring. It is the basis from which MAGTF commanders view future
contingency operations. The scenario also establishes an understanding of
problems encountered in satisfying the tactical commander's intelligence
needs.
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B. REVIEW OF THE FUNDAMENTALS
Characteristically, the contingencies occurred in less developed regions of
the world, often in urban areas, about which little information was available
to the Marine force. The operational environment presented many
uncertainties and little time to resolve them. The missions were high-risk,
high-gain military operations of great political or military sensitivity.
There are fundamental uniformities of operational and intelligence
support issues which established themselves time and time again in "war as
it really is" to Marines. General operational issues were:
• The missions were primarily LIC peacetime contingencies and
secondly, peacekeeping operations.
• The nature of the conflict environment and mission was ambiguous.
Usually mission objectives had to be achieved through negotiating
with host authorities rather than physical seizure.
• A battalion landing team was the basic size of the unit which
conducted ground operations.
• Planning time prior to execution was very limited and planning
occurred at sea. Planning problems for tactical units resulted from
"higher headquarters'" need for OPSEC—the tactical commander was
purposely left "in the dark."
• Political sensitivities and diplomatic considerations dominated the
tactical concerns of the commander.
• Limited presence and /or low visibility was required by the Marine
force.
• Decisive action, though difficult, worked in developing the ambiguous
situation to meet Marine objectives. Successful operations resulted
from decisively backing some recognized authority.
• Liaison early with American embassy personnel was critical in
establishing the intent of the mission and sorting out the rules of
engagement (ROE).
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Command and control communications from ship to shore was a
serious problem.
Countersurveillance and countersniper operations were critical.
Extreme discipline on the part of individual Marines was a must, as
ROE were very restrictive.
The operations were joint or became joint within a few days.
Some of the recurring generic intelligence requirements were:
National intelligence source information must be confirmed using
direct support or organic assets to attain the detail necessary to conduct
small, limited objective operations.
Organic or direct support aerial reconnaissance was desired for
responsiveness in a time-compressed environment.
SIGINT was very necessary, but military signals collection tended to be
ineffective against low-powered/low-tech communications devices.
HUMINT was the most useful source of information and the most
deficient. It came from embassy personnel, host government, military,
and police agencies, interrogations of locals and elements of rebel
factions, and from basic patrolling.
Initial estimates of the enemy size, strength, and disposition were
oversimplified. Current and accurate estimates were critical for
effectively orienting the Marines on enemy capabilities and intentions.
Beach and aircraft landing zone reconnaissance was critical and
deficient. There was over-reliance on old data.
Political-social-cultural intelligence was deficient for understanding
and evaluating the seriousness of threats. The best sources were the
embassy (if effective early liaison was made) and constant liaison with
host agencies.
Current intelligence on facilities around which Marines operated was
critical for proper planning and execution.
Maps were always out of date for the areas operated in, particularly in
urban areas.
Linguists were lacking in all cases. An ability to interpret locals and
other friendlies was critical toward collecting reliable HUMINT and
effecting liaison with host agencies.
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• Intelligence communications with the embassy and from ship to shore
was a recurring problem.
• The Marine Corps needed a Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
capability to deal with the political-economic-sociological aspects of the
conflicts.
• A single intelligence center to process all-source information was
missing. That center was desired to be as close to the tactical
commander as possible and focused on his needs. It must be capable of
interoperating with other services and countries.
Ultimately, the Marine Corps needs to operate within an intelligence
network or architecture that is conceptually designed as a system of
organizations, doctrines, and technologies that provides operational
intelligence to the tactical commander. A thorough understanding of the
important intelligence requirements is necessary in order to build a Marine
Corps architecture. The Marine Corps must take the lead to articulate and
bring its requirements to the forefront of national and theater command
attention. This chapter was designed to provide insight on and narrow the
scope of what IRs the Marine Corps might articulate first. Again, these ERs
encompass certain operational characteristics that have established
themselves over time and have become a "gap" in effecting successful
mission completion. The lessons learned are not learned at all—it seems as if
"powers that be" believe the Marine Corps is always embarking on a future
unlike our past. Filling this gap is fundamental for intelligence connectivity
to the most readily employed Marine combat force. Articulating and
understanding IRs is certainly the first step in directing and tailoring
intelligence support.
Chapter V presents the current operating force structure, the MAGTF
concept. This is necessary for narrowing the subject to the BLT-based
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MEU(SOC), and particularly the intelligence architecture needed to meet the
baseline IRs of Marine warfighting commanders.
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V. ORGANIZING FOR OPERATIONS
A. THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE (MAGTF) CONCEPT
When the Marine Corps deploys its forces, whether as an amphibious
landing force (LF) or as an air contingency force (ACF), it "task organizes" into
a unique force structure of command, ground combat, aviation combat, and
combat service support elements (CE, GCE, ACE, and CSSE respectively).
These operational forces of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) form combined-
arms teams called Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) structured to
accomplish a specific set of missions.
Another pertinent force adjustment occurred in 1988 with the creation of
the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG). This is the
command focal point/structure that provides the MAGTF commanders with
an enhanced organization for directing and coordinating all assets that
conduct intelligence functions and direct action missions. (See Figure 1.)




















Figure 1. Organization of a MAGTF
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In the FMF, Atlantic and Pacific, there are essentially three large MAGTFs
called Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), each consisting of a ground
division, an aircraft wing, a force service support group, and a command
element (commanded by a two- or three-star general). Each MEF can
alternately form two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), comprised of a
reinforced infantry regiment (Regimental Landing Team, RLT), and aircraft
group (Marine Aircraft Group, MAG), a Brigade Service Support Group
(BSSG), and a command element (commanded by a one-star general). The
smallest routinely used unit, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), consists
of a reinforced infantry battalion (Battalion Landing Team, BLT) called the
Ground Combat Element (GCE), a reinforced helicopter squadron referred to
as the Air Combat Element (ACE), MEU Service Support Group (MSSG) and
command element (commanded by a colonel). (Karch, 1988, p. 42)
Figure 2 is a summary of the distribution of MAGTFs in the Marine Corps
today. (Hobbs, 1988, p. 41) Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC)
is located at Camp Smith, HI and administratively commands I MEF at Camp
Pendleton, California and III MEF at Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan. The 5th
MEB is at Camp Pendleton; 7th MEB is located at Twenty-nine Palms,
California; 9th MEB is at Camp Hansen, Okinawa; and 1st MEB is located at
Kaneohe Bay, HI. All three west coast MEU(SOC)s are based at Camp
Pendleton. On the east coast, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
(FMFLANT) is located at Norfolk, VA and the MAGTFs are all out of Camp


























































Figure 2. Distribution of MAGTFs
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In 1983, a MEU was employed in the Grenada contingency operation. To
further exemplify the flexibility of this concept, it is important to note that
smaller tailor-made contingency MAGTF units can and have been used. This
was the case in the Persian Gulf, PRAYING MANTIS Operation in 1988,
where the GCE was a reinforced infantry company. Acting on evidence that
Iran had laid mines that damaged the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian
Gulf, the U.S. retaliated with attacks on two oil platforms that had been used
to help direct attacks on civilian shipping. The Sassan oil /gas separation
platform was destroyed by Marines in a limited objective attack.
B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT
(MEU(SOO)
The MEU(SOC)s, instituted in 1985, are of great importance. These units
consist of approximately 2000 Marines and are forward deployed on
amphibious ships through continuous unit rotation. At least two
MEU(SOC)s are continually maintained—one with the Sixth Fleet in the
Mediterranean, under U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and another
with the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific, under U.S. Pacific Command
(USPACOM). MEU(SOC)s are the leading edge of the Marine Corps' deployed
forces around the globe. They are designed to respond to crisis situations
when time does not allow the deployment of a large force. They deserve
being called the "pointy end of the spear," (Hobbs, 1988, p. 40) although the
erratic operational /intelligence support historically rendered to the deployed
Marine forces might justify the label "end of the whip."
Figure 3 shows the composition of the Marine Corps' MEU(SOC)s. (Linn,
1990, p. 39) The command element (CE) is the MAGTF Headquarters. The CE
39
establishes and executes the C4I2 necessary for the effective planning and
successful completion of operations. (MAGTF Intelligence Operations






















2,050 Marines plus 100






• 5 tanks or 17 light armored
vehicles
• 12 amphibious assault
vehicles
• 32 E>ragon missile launchers
(antiarmor)




• 8-81 mm mortars
• 9-60mm mortars
• 20-.50 caliber machineguns
• 60-7.62mm machineguns
• 26-40mm grenade launchers
Figure 3. Special Operations Capable Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU(SOO)
AIRCRAFT
• 12-CH-46 medium light
helicopters
• 4-CH-53 (D or E) heavy lift
assault transport helicopters
• 4-AH-l attack helicopters
• 3-UH-l utility helicopters
• 6-AV-8B vertical/short
takeoff and landing attack
aircraft
• 2-KC-130 serial refuelers
• 20 Stinger surface-to-air
missile launchers
C SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (SO/LIC)
MEU(SOC)s will play a significant role in future limited wars in which
the United States could employ forces. Forward deployed, limited in size and
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poised for action, these forces operate with a strategically mobile fleet and
provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) with considerable
flexibility for responding to an unexpected crisis. They are independent and
require little coordination with the deployment of forces from CONUS or
other theaters of operation. An example of this independence and flexibility
was Liberia, 1990, Operation SHARP EDGE. The MEU(SOC) loitered off the
coast of that nation in a limited war environment. This unobtrusive
loitering is an inherent characteristic of naval power projection.
MEU(SOC)s and the Navy and Marine teams which form ARG/MEUs
must be capable of operating in a wide variety of situations and
environments. It becomes impossible to do the kind of exact preparation
when deployed that land basing offers. Therefore, the ARG/MEU has a
difficult task and must plan while en route to the objective area prior to the
assault phase. This creates a time-compressed planning and execution
environment that has obvious ramifications on the ability to command and
control and gather required intelligence on the enemy, weather and terrain.
The Marine Corps responded to the threat environment changing to LIC
by applying its amphibious and expeditionary expertise and progressively
upgrading the unit's skills through enhanced training and the addition of
special equipment and tactics. Also, the Corps has incorporated a rapid
response planning sequence into its C4I2 to support the following list of 18
capabilities/missions of the MEU(SOC):
• Amphibious Raids
• Security Operations
• Limited Objective Attacks
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Mobile Training Teams
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs)








Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)
Clandestine Recovery Operations
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)
In-Extremis Hostage Rescue
The rapid response planning sequence is depicted in more detail in the
Appendix. It is based on time-tested command and staff action steps taught
for years at Quantico and Newport, it has been modified to be incorporated as
a C4I2 tool for MEU(SOC)s to meet a six-hour crisis response time. Rapid
response planning for these LIC missions relies on standardized briefings,
formats and uniform means for disseminating and displaying
information/ intelligence to ensure the MEU and PHIBRON are properly
briefed. Since MEU(SOC)s must be prepared to deal with several missions
simultaneously, the MEU and PHIBRON rely on detailed comprehensive
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). These contain the various "packages"
of requirements for each type of mission. The primary function of SOPs is to
eliminate lengthy operations orders by allowing "planning by exception." The
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objectives of the process are to enhance speed and decisiveness. "Planning by
exception" facilitates this because prior to receipt of the mission each
commander and staff member knows exactly what his role is in the planning
and preparation process. (Brinkley and Rakow, 1989, pp. 18-21)
Intelligence requirements are generically listed for likely scenarios so that
collection can begin prior to and continue throughout the deployment. To
quote two Marines who have worked this aspect of C4I2 : "We will never be as
prepared or as ready as we want to be; neither will the enemy. The rapid
response planning (and preparation) process gives us the edge. The product is
a PHIBRON-MEU(SOC) team with a thorough understanding of its
capabilities, a validated set of national plans, and a high level of training and
readiness." (Brinkley and Rakow, 1989, p. 21) The closely integrated working
relationship of the Marines and Navy is reflected by calling this progression
the ARG/MEU(SOC) training and certification process. (Magee and Wilson,
1990, p. 16)
The thesis so far has established the most prevalent operational context
within which the Marine Corps fights. This "paradigm of warfare" is based
on the experience of threat, missions, and task organization. There are
baseline intelligence requirements. Why does the Marine Corps continue to
have the same problems of intelligence support to the ARG/MEU(SOC)
conducting peacekeeping and peacetime contingency operations? Further
insight into the recurring problems of intelligence support is achieved by
analyzing the most prevalent mission a MEU(SOC) has done, a NEO, to
illustrate special operations in low-intensity conflict.
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D. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR SO/LIC
The noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) exemplifies the peculiar
intelligence requirements that must be met in a special operations /low-
intensity conflict environment. The success of such high-risk, high-stakes,
politically sensitive operations can hinge on the accuracy and timeliness of
intelligence. The U.S. Government reserves the right to protect its citizens
and property in foreign soil. The enemy may not be a politically-organized
entity, but an ambiguous system or environment in which, for a number of
reasons, U.S. citizens live.
Noncombatant evacuation operations are conducted for the purpose of
evacuating these civilians from locations in a foreign country faced with the
threat, or fact, of hostile actions. A NEO operation is an unconventional
mission with numerous unusual essential elements of information (EEIs).
These EEIs have special considerations for collection and production,
depending, generally, on whether the NEO is to be conducted permissively or
nonpermissively.
Permissive NEOs require little displacement of combat forces ashore and
are usually done with the host nation's concurrence and possibly support.
Therefore, the chore for the ARG/MEU becomes mostly logistical in nature, a
problem of moving noncombatants by a variety of vehicles to a variety of
locations.
Nonpermissive environments, with a threat to the evacuation operation,
require combat forces ashore. These threats can range from civil disorders
and terrorist actions to full scale combat operations. Nonpermissive means
the host nation government may not support the evacuation and the MEU
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may be required to conduct a forced entry using combat power projection.
Combat forces may be required to establish defensive perimeters around
evacuation sites, escort convoys of evacuees, participate in recovery
operations of evacuees, and screen them prior to evacuation. Many of these
tasks are normally the responsibility of the Department of State officials.
The tasking of a NEO happens in a time-compressed and evolving crisis
environment. Figure 4 shows the typical organizational structure that
conducts the NEO in WestPac. (USMC, Landing Force Training Command,
Pacific, 1989, p. 1-6) This unique tasking and command and control structure
reveals the NEO to differ from normal military operations in several critical
respects. The initiation of a NEO is a closely held political decision starting
with the Ambassador; hence, early liaison with the Defense Attache Office
could provide a great deal of vital information about the background, current
situation, and prospects for the CATF and CLF directed to conduct the
operation. The NEO evolves quite rapidly into a military mission once the
ambassador's request is approved by the President. This causes a strict
sensitivity to the timing of execution of the military phase. Coordinating
directly with the State Department officials is a key necessity. These officials
control the timing of mission execution and often impose restrictive ROE
which preclude critical planning functions (e.g. conducting site surveys of
helicopter landing zones, evacuation points, etc.). (USMC, Landing Force
Training Command, Pacific, 1989, p. 1-2)
The characteristics of NEOs can be summarized as: uncertainty in
planning; limited military objectives; and the ultimate care of civilians and
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Tasking.The request for a MAGTF to conduct evacuation operations
will normally be in accordance with the following diagram.
Ambassador—through State Department
The President and Secretary of Defense Approve
Coordination by National Military
Command Center and State Department's
Washington Liaison Group
JCS

















Figure 4. NEO Organization Structure
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maintenance of order. Uncertainty in the planning phase and throughout
the operation is the greatest obstacle to overcome operationally and is where
intelligence problems are compounded. The timing of the evacuation is not a
military decision as much as it is a function of an ambiguous threat and the
political impact of withdrawing U.S. personnel. The location(s) where
combat forces will be positioned also is politically sensitive; although
evacuations usually take place near the capital, large cities, or military bases,
preplanned sites may not be available. The actual size of the landing force
may not be determined until the "11th hour," so the forces committed to the
operation and the forces actually employed will vary according to State
Department arrangements. The means of insertion of the landing force and
extraction of noncombatants and landing force will depend on—among other
things—vehicle availability and weather. The number of noncombatant
evacuees requires the earliest planning and depends on Embassy personnel to
coordinate. The presence and disposition of a hostile force may not be known
nor can the reaction of the host country always be foreseen. The duration of
the execution phase of the operation depends on the type and number of lift
vehicles, number of evacuees, size of the landing force, geography, and the
hostile threat. Secondly, it is military objectives which dictate most military
operations. However, in a NEO these are very constricted by time and
restrictive ROE. Thirdly, information will be required on the do's and don'ts
of civilian care and maintenance of order. Items such as medical care and
personal necessities must be preplanned ashore and afloat. (USMC, Landing
Force Training Command, Pacific, 1989, p. 1-6,7)
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The intelligence requirements for noncombatant operations are, thus,
unusual. They are intimately connected to the "rapid planning process"; they
demand extremely detailed information; and commonly they require special
products for particular consumers. Dissemination of intelligence must be
timely, accurate and the result of a fusion of all sources available to cull only
the most pertinent of available information. The following considerations
apply:
• Considerable organic and external collection and analytical resources
will be dedicated to a relatively small force and objective area;
• Support to the rapid planning process demands a rapid information
turnaround;
• Work done prior to receiving an execution order must anticipate the
intelligence requirements to save valuable time. The use of generic
intelligence requirements expedites promulgation of needs;
• There is great emphasis on graphical displays of intelligence on the
NEO target area. These include terrain models, building diagrams, and
gridded photos. Such graphics increase the consumer's understanding
and speed up the planning process while improving detailed
comprehension by the operating forces;
• Intelligence personnel from the MEU, SRIG, Navy, or possibly theater
and national levels must be organized into detachments and assigned
to the advance party and any other units going ashore apart from the
main command cells. Their mission is to collect for higher command
and provide tailored support to the unit to which they are attached;
• It is the immediate, continuous, and close cooperation with other
military services and government agencies in theater which will
greatly contribute to the intelligence effort of the MEU Intelligence
Officer. Early, direct liaison authorization to the attache is vital; and
• The basic ability to communicate with evacuees and local officials must
be obtained rapidly by the operating forces.
The determination of intelligence requirements is the initial step in the
direction of intelligence collection. A full understanding of the national and
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theater intelligence assets and capabilities is required of every ARG/MEU
intelligence section. The following is a basic list of systems and products for
IMINT, SIGINT and HUMINT exploitation for the ARG/MEU(SOC)
conducting a NEO. (MAGTF Intelligence Operations (FMFM 3-21), 1990, p. 13-
10)
Imagery resources include:
• Special Activities Office (SAO) Package;
• If a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) is near, F-14 with Tactical Aerial
Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS);
• Imagery support from theater intelligence centers like the Joint
Intelligence Center, Pacific (JICPAC) and Atlantic Intelligence
Command (AIC) via the Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST);
• Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS) data base provides textual
only information; an upgrade to NIPS is the Naval Warfare Tactical
Database (NWTDB) which integrates other DoD textual databases; and
• Handheld imagery provided by Department of State, military attaches,
advance party, or possibly helicopter overflights, if permitted. (USMC,
Landing Force Training Command, Pacific, 1989, p. 1-16)
SIGINT resources include:
• National assets from National Security Agency (NSA) or theater assets
from FOSIFs (preferably direct);
• There is a greater SIGINT capability associated with a CVBG than an
ARG if it is in the vicinity;
• The MEU has an organic Radio Battalion detachment for limited
tactical EW support; and
• Ultimately communications intelligence obtained by the advance party,
the Embassy and a friendly host country could provide some of the
more timely and reliable SIGINT. (USMC, Landing Force Training
Command, Pacific, 1989, p. 1-16)
HUMINT resources include:
• Counterintelligence representatives will be attached to the MEU and
provide the connectivity for HUMINT directly from the Embassy or
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evacuation site(s). National level HUMINT support tends not to be as
time sensitive as a crisis response requires unless a CIA JILE
team/system or other service HUMINT support team is brought aboard
the command ship. (USMC, Landing Force Training Command,
Pacific, 1989, p. 1-16)
Unfortunately, there is limited organic intelligence support to the
ARG/MEU; other theater, service, and national assets are required to do the
job well. And, as Brigadier General Paul K. Van Riper stated after observing
Marine Corps intelligence support in DESERT STORM: "If we don't own the
system, we will stand in line to get our fair share of the product." (Van Riper,
1991, p.61)
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VI. ORGANIZING FOR INTELLIGENCE
A dilemma arises whenever an ARG/MEU gets mobilized for an
operation. On the one hand, the commanders' decision-making and staff
actions must be streamlined and resources must be allocated efficiently to the
units to be committed. Operational efficiency is all-important; otherwise,
resources are squandered and the tactical force may be defeated. The dilemma
for the intelligence structure is the need for streamlined actions balanced
against the need for exact, detailed intelligence. The intelligence product is
the focus of all effort. Each commander must appreciate that the structure he
utilizes will reflect various kinds of trade-offs; the commander's
responsibility lies in defining his mission's intelligence requirements so that
the intelligence structure will be optimized for his mission.
The overall integrated intelligence effort is planned and coordinated
under the MEU and ARG commanders' instructions by the MEU S-2 and
ARG (PHIBRON) N-2. The production of intelligence, from the
determination of IRs and essential elements of information (EEIs) to the final
dissemination of intelligence, must be carefully orchestrated to ensure the
timely, accurate, and detailed intelligence required by the commander. The
planning and coordination of the integrated intelligence effort requires early
identification of IRs, timely collection planning, analytical effort to produce
intelligence, and dissemination early enough to be of use to the command.
The ARG/MEU N-2/S-2 must have their organic intelligence sections
augmented to accomplish many of these tasks. (MAGTF Intelligence
Operations (FMFM 3-21), 1990, p. 7-11)
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In virtually every intelligence after-action report, the amphibious task
force commander and the landing force commander have expressed concern
regarding the lack of direct, tactically tailored, near-real-time operational
intelligence support for the Naval/Marine Corps power projection missions.
The infrastructures of the operational intelligence architecture seem to have
been the source of the problems.
Many times dissemination of a product did not occur because of a lack of
understanding of the various commands, operating levels, and intelligence
staffs. Technological shortfalls were less a problem than convoluted
organizational and procedural situations. In response to intelligence
shortfalls which had been encountered through 1987, the Marine Corps
carried its C4I2 initiatives into the Fleet Marine Force. All FMF intelligence
assets were organized into Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Groups
(SRIGs). In addition to consolidating each MEF's intelligence collection,
production, and dissemination capabilities, the SRIG incorporated other
unique units that had dissemination, deception, and maritime direct action
capabilities. (Ryan, 1990, p. 60)
A. SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SRIG)
The reason for creating the SRIG was to give every MAGTF the capability
to conduct time/target sensitive operations using specially trained, self-
sufficient, sea-based Marines; all MAGTFs were to be special operations
capable (Wilson, 1988, p.68). So, driven by its experiences in LIC, the Marine
Corps is tailoring a warfighting "umbrella concept." The procedural aspects of
this new concept come from SOC and maneuver warfare doctrines; the
organizational aspects of it are MAGTF, C4I2, and SRIG concepts.
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According to the SRIG doctrinal manual, FMFM 3-22 (Coordinating Draft
of October 1990), the mission of the SRIG is to provide surveillance,
reconnaissance, intelligence, counterintelligence, electronic warfare, air and
naval gunfire liaison, tactical deception, maritime direct action and secure
communications to MAGTFs. Conceptually, the SRIG is to bring the function
of "unity of effort" and C4I2 to the commander and the MAGTF operation. It
accomplishes this by assigning an officer-in-charge (OIC) to a flexibly task-
organized detachment, as appropriate to the mission and size MAGTF. The
SRIG Det is expected to be capable of conducting multi-source information-
gathering missions using organic assets, and to provide the tactical
commander with near-real-time, all-source intelligence during all phases of
all operations. (SRIG, FMFM 3-22, 1990, p. 1-5) Since perfect battlefield
intelligence is impossible, and collection and analytic assets are limited, only a
fraction of the information theoretically available is going to become
intelligence. The MAGTF intelligence officer and SRIG Det OIC must ensure
that the commander is getting that fraction of the information he deems
essential. (SRIG, FMFM 3-22, 1990, p. 2-4)
There are three SRIGs in the Marine Corps. In October 1988, 2nd SRIG
stood up in II MEF, Camp Lejeune. In October 1989, 1st SRIG stood up in I
MEF, Camp Pendleton. And in October 1990, 3rd SRIG began consolidating in
Okinawa. Figure 5 is a depiction of a typical MEF SRIG. It is led by a colonel
and consists, at full strength, of approximately 2,400 Marines.
Ideally, the smaller MEU SRIG Det consists of:
• 1 OIC and 2 enlisted as a Headquarters Det;






























Figure 5. Current SRIG Structure
1 officer and 2 enlisted Counterintelligence Team (CIT) Marines;
2 enlisted imagery interpreters from the Force Imagery Interpretation
Unit (FLTU);
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2 enlisted Marines from Topographic Platoon;
1 officer and 3 enlisted MAGTF All-source Fusion Center (MAFC)
Marines;
1 officer and 3 enlisted from the Tactical Deception Platoon (Tac-D);
2 officers and 11 enlisted Marines of Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison
Company (ANGLICO);
2 officers and 26 enlisted from Radio Battalion (RADBN);
14 enlisted from Communications Battalion;
2 officers and 16 enlisted from Force Reconnaissance Company;
1 officer and 8 enlisted from Remote Piloted Vehicle (RPV) Company;
(SRIG, FMFM 3-22, 1990, pp. 3-34,35)
The MEU SRIG detachment brings a total of 11 officers and 97 enlisted to
assist the MEU commander in the C4 I2 aspects of communications,
intelligence, maritime direct action, and fire support coordination. The
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC) is manned by double-
hatting various SRIG personnel. The following is a short summary of the
intelligence assets in the SRIG Det.
The IP Det is to plan for and collect HUMINT from prisoners, detainees,
and captured documents. CIT's mission is to collect information regarding
the threats of espionage, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism. It also conducts
special HUMINT operations for the MEU. The characteristics of an objective
area determine the character and extent of CI operations. The density of the
population, its cultural level, the attitude of the people and political groups
toward friendly and enemy forces and the stability of the local governments
are all factors in determining the numbers of CITs needed for the mission.
(SRIG, FMFM 3-22, 1990, p. 9-27) FIIU provides imagery interpretation to
support operations. TOPO is to provide tailored mapping, charting, and
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geodetic (MC&G) and terrain analysis products. (Tri-MEF Field Intelligence
SOP, FMFRP 3-28, 1989, p. 3-4)
The MAFC Det is responsible for providing the personnel, intelligence
databases, and equipment to assist the MEU S-2 in conducting analysis,
production, collection management, and target intelligence. The SARC is to
direct, coordinate, and monitor intelligence collection operations conducted
by organic assets. (Tri-MEF Field Intelligence SOP, 1989, p. 3-3) It should be
noted that there are ongoing discrepancies in the doctrinal sources on SRIG
support to the MEU. In actuality, a MAFC and SARC will not join a MEU
unless it requires extensive intelligence augmentation (SRIG, FMFM 3-22,
1990, p. 9-47).
The RADBN Det has the mission to conduct tactical SIGINT, ground EW
operations, and communications security (COMSEC) monitoring and
analysis. The Force Recon Det has the intelligence missions of conducting
pre-assault and deep post-assault ground reconnaissance and surveillance
operations. It also is specially trained to conduct direct action missions such
as in-extremis rescue at night from sea at significant distances. (Tri-MEF Field
Intelligence SOP, FMFRP 3-28, 1989, p. 3-3)
The RPV Det uses the Pioneer system and is the only aerial
reconnaissance capability in the MEU. Most MEUs actually do not take any
RPVs with them because there are not enough airframes in the inventory
and the capability to launch and recover from amphibious shipping is not
fully established in the Navy and Marine Corps. Only two RPVs are to be
purchased in 1991 and 1992. The RPV or follow-on unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) system is critical to any MAGTF for providing real-time target
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acquisition, battlefield surveillance, reconnaissance, and radio relay support.
(Concepts and Issues, 1989, p. 3-5)
This thesis cannot examine all the organizations, procedures, and
technologies which were in place during recent conflicts. A useful analytic
distinction is intelligence support from national to theater and from theater
to tactical. In order to achieve greater insight about the problem of
intelligence architecture for the Navy/Marine Corps team, the thesis
examines the current intelligence apparatus in place for a typical
ARG/MEU(SOC) force from the perspective of FMFPAC. In a peacetime
contingency environment the emphasis is on getting the right amount and
type of intelligence support forward to the deployed ARG/MEU using an
operationally-oriented C4I2 architecture.
B. INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE FOR OPERATIONS AFLOAT
When in the Western Pacific (WestPac), the afloat MEU is under
operational control (OPCON) of CG III MEF until receipt of operational
mission orders. The ARG is under OPCON Third Fleet while in the Eastern
Pacific (EastPac) waters, and OPCON to Seventh Fleet while in WestPac.
Upon receipt of an operational mission, the ARG is designated the
amphibious task force (ATF) and remains subordinate to the Seventh Fleet.
The MEU is designated LF and is subordinated to Commander, ATF and the
numbered Fleet. When employed ashore, the MEU will normally remain
under OPCON of the Commander, ATF, unless directed by USCINCPAC to
operate under its control or under control of a JTF. (Fleet Marine Force,
Pacific (FMFPAC), Intelligence Sub-Architecture, 1990, p. 2-16).
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Shipboard C4I2 is designed to serve the Commodore of the ARG (captain)
and the Commander of the MEU (colonel). When the ARG/MEU receives its
mission these officers become Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF)
and Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) respectively. These
commanders' normal battle stations are usually on the command ship (LHA,
LHD, LCC) in the Tactical Flag Command Center/Flag Plot (TFCC/FP) and the
Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC).
The mission of the TFCC/FP is to monitor and control the assault phase
of an amphibious landing. The TFCC/FP provides the CATF with integrated
systems for collecting, displaying, evaluating, and disseminating tactical and
command information for effective employment of his forces. The TFCC/FP
enables coordination with higher commands such as the Joint Task Force
(JTF) Commander and /or Fleet Commander, Theater CinC, National Military
Command Center, and the National Command Authority. It also
communicates with any Carrier Battle Group, Surface Action Group, and
individual ships of the ATF. (Marine Corps Research, Development, and
Acquisition Command [MCRDAC], 1990, sect. 42)
The communications connectivity is provided to higher commands
using the ship's general service (GENSER) Communications Center (SCO for
secure worldwide GENSER voice and teletype (TTY); Ship's Signals
Exploitation Space (SSES) for secure worldwide special intelligence
communications (SPINTCOMM); and liaison teams from JTF, Theater CinC
and/or national assets using secure portable satellite communications
(SATCOMM) systems. Communications from ship to ship is GENSER voice
and TTY. (MCRDAC, 1990, sect. 42)
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A critical C4 I2 tool used by the warfighting commanders aboard the
command ship is the Joint Operational Tactical System (JOTS). JOTS is a
prototype system that fundamentally uses increased computer software
processing capabilities to rearrange and fuse various computerized shipboard
command and control systems, satellite communications, and intelligence
systems to provide a tactical surface surveillance picture to the commanders
of the ATF. JOTS operates on the Navy's standard desk-top computer, the HP
9020A. The expansion capability of the HP 9020A ensures that any change to
the JOTS can be handled without major hardware revisions. JOTS software
utilizes a database management approach and can be adjusted to the needs of
the CATF.
On the LHA the HP9020A is set up in a fiber optic local area network
(LAN) that connects TFCC/FP, Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) room,
Combat Information Center (CIC), Supporting Arms Coordination Center
(SACC), and Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). All the information that comes
into these command and control nodes can be fully shared and/or tailored for
pixel color computer terminal display. Additional display screens are located
in the War Room (for CATF planning), LFOC, and Helicopter Direction
Center (HDC). JOTS is essentially a local area network to display tactical
friendly and enemy information from various operational and intelligence
workstations and databases. The system is directly linked throughout the
ATF and rest of the world by a satellite channel known as OTCIXS (officer in
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tactical command information exchange system) which allows real time
input. (International Research Institute [INRI], 1988, pp. 1-15)3
The LFOC is a shipboard command center for the CLF to command and
control the operations of the landing force. Generally, the LFOC will use a
combination of manual and automated systems such as manually plotted
situation maps and voice/digital radio communications and computer
information systems to display information and intelligence relating to the
LF situation during the landing and subsequent operations ashore. The LFOC
is not established ashore. The MEU Combat Operations Center (COC)
assumes the functions of the LFOC and absorbs LFOC personnel and
equipment during LF operations ashore. (MCRDAC, 1990, sect. 50)
The communications connectivity for the LFOC is GENSER-only and it
establishes a number of LF GENSER voice and FAX radio nets. The LFOC and
the TFCC/FP are linked with all warfighting centers on the command ship. If
necessary, communications could terminate with Airborne Command,
Control, and Communications (ABCCC) systems and/or an American
Embassy in the TFCC/FP and LFOC. (MCRDAC, 1990, sect. 59)
The Ship's Signals Exploitation Space (SSES) is a designated, restricted
access, shipboard space that provides the facilities, equipment, and personnel
required to detect, classify, monitor, record, evaluate, and disseminate selected
3The author spent one week on the USS Peleliu (LHA 5) out of Long
Beach, California for research with PHIBRON 3 and 15th MEU(SOC) from 22
to 29 March, 1991. Additionally, the author toured the Naval Ocean Systems
Center (NOSC) San Diego, California, for research on 8 May 1991. NOSC
provides systems engineering, development, and integration of all command
and control systems for afloat users.
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foreign communications and non-communications information. The SSES
provides Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Cryptologic Electronic Warfare
Support Measures (CESM), and special intelligence communications
(SPINTCOMM) support to the CATF and CLF. The SSES provides early threat
warning and rapid dissemination of other special intelligence indications and
warning (I&W) information received through the activated Special Security
Communications Center (SSCC) circuits maintained within the SSES. When
the LF goes ashore, the SSES personnel must continue to support the ATF
and MEU. (MCRDAC, 1990, sect. 46)
The Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) is the shipboard space that incorporates
all intelligence personnel, materials, support functions, and intelligence
systems of both the CATF and CLF to provide nearly all intelligence support
to the ATF and LF. (There are limited organic intelligence assets on other
ATF ships.) The effort is to reduce duplicative functions and produce more
comprehensive and timely intelligence for all Navy and Marine forces. The
JIC functions to: consolidate intelligence requirements for the ATF as a
whole; prepare an integrated joint collection plan and/or worksheet;
coordinate and process collection requests to higher and supporting activities;
manage organic collection assets and activities; and collect and evaluate
information to produce and disseminate intelligence for the planning and
conduct of amphibious-based operations. (MCRDAC, 1990, sect. 43)
The CATF controls the JIC but it is normally shared by his N-2 (lieutenant
commander) and the MEU S-2 (major) along with the ship's company
intelligence officer (lieutenant commander). During landing force
embarkation, personnel from the MEU intelligence section augmented by
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required SRIG Detachment personnel will be incorporated into JIC watch
sections in order to conduct sustained 24-hour intelligence operations. Total
JIC manning is about 30 personnel including supervisors, intelligence
analysts and clerks, and ADP operators. Basic facility support and the
accessing and updating of prepositioned intelligence materials is provided by
the ship's personnel. (Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
[SPAWAR-317], 1987, p. 3-48) All LF intelligence personnel become part of the
COC when it is established ashore except for a few necessary LF intelligence
personnel who continue to support the ATF/LF from the JIC. (MCRDAC,
1990, sect. 43)
The JIC coordinates with the JTF J-2, Theater Cine J-2, Joint Intelligence
Center Pacific (JICPAC) or AIC as appropriate, national intelligence agencies,
and the American embassy if necessary. It also coordinates with assigned
organic surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, and electronic warfare
assets of the ATF and LF. (MCRDAC, 1990, sect. 43) Communications
connectivity is the same as the TFCC/FP and LFOC combined, but an
additional SATCOM net terminates in the JIC for receiving imagery
transmitted to the Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST).
The systems deployed by the JIC depend on the type of ship used.
Generally, the JIC will have a combination of systems that will range from
simple microfiche readers to portable and mainframe computer systems and
special purpose terminal systems. The USS Peleliu (LHA 5) has the following
systems supporting the JIC:
• Naval Intelligence Processing System-Personal Computer (NIPS-PC).
NIPS-PC is a computerized disk database of naval and amphibious
warfare intelligence information. It is a collection of selected data from
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various DoD agencies and generally is composed of information about
facilities, installations, and platforms, and the weapons and sensors
aboard them whether on land or sea. NIPS operates at the GENSER
secret level. The NIPS-PC database is textual data only and must be
periodically updated by physically delivering diskettes and hardcopy
reports to the ship. By 1992, a Mini-NIPS upgraded system is planned
to incorporate graphics and real-time capability by receiving a direct
broadcast from Naval Intelligence Automation Center. (Commander
Naval Intelligence Command, 1990, pp. 1-8)
Prototype Ocean Surveillance Terminal (POST) system. POST is a
special purpose terminal capable of processing, correlating, and
geographically displaying non-organic multi-sensor air, surface, and
land-based ELINT data and platform reports. Its primary tactical use is
to provide C3I support to power projection planning and operations.
POST interfaces with the TADIXS-B/TRE Broadcast.
Tactical Data Information Exchange-Bravo/Tactical Receive Equipment
(TADIXS B/TRE). TRE is the shipboard system that is designed to
provide highly accurate, near-real-time, electronic support measures
(ESM) contact reports of the entire world. In general, ESM is the
passive use of an enemy's electromagnetic emissions
(communications, radar, etc.) for detection, identification, and location.
A typical ESM contact report would consist of parameters like the
signal characteristics (frequency, pulse repetition rate, etc.), type of
emitter (air search, commercial navigation, etc.), time of interception,
and bearing to, or location of, the contact. TRE receives worldwide
electronic intelligence (ELINT) broadcasts over TADIXS-B, decrypts the
data, and filters the reports to produce tactical displays as desired by the
functional warfare area operators. So, a TRE display may only have
airborne contacts or only shore-based contacts. (MATT, ATRE Review,
1989, pp. 1-2)
Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST) system. The FIST provides
deployed forces with the capability to receive and transmit hardcopy
and softcopy imagery. Softcopy imagery can be enhanced, manipulated,
annotated, and stored. Hardcopy is provided by a digital printer which
can produce prints on both paper and film. FIST requires a
UHF/SATCOM channel which it usually shares with another net.
Much has been written about the FIST; it is criticized for not providing
targeting quality imagery and for taking too much time for each image
transmission. However, FIST does show tactically significant changes
at the target location.
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Some optional systems that can be brought aboard ship to augment
intelligence operations in the JIC are:
• DIA National Military Intelligence Support Team (NMIST) system.
NMIST uses a Scalable Transportable Intelligence Communications
System (STICS) to support secure intelligence communications
requirements. The NMIST mission is to be a crisis intelligence "gap-
filler" by responding to the tactical commander's IRs. It is expected to
improve dissemination of national intelligence through DIA liaison.
NMIST augments existing crisis support systems with text and imagery
data. There are four deployable teams of three personnel, which were
increased to seven teams during Operation DESERT STORM. 4
• CIA Joint Intelligence Liaison Element (JILE) system. The Central
Intelligence Agency also can provide its own personnel to support a
Marine operation. There are three deployable JILE teams available for
continency response, using a STICS to communicate with international
CIA HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT assets
• NSA Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility (MCSF) or SATCOM
Tributary system. The Tributary net uses STICS to provide the
contingency force commander with direct access to NSA SIGINT
products.
These shipboard systems are owned by or assigned to the Navy but must
be understood by the Marines. The JIC will continue to support all Marine
operations until the command element is well established ashore.
C MEU INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE FOR OPERATIONS ASHORE
The MEU intelligence section consists of: the S-2, a major; S-2 Assistant, a
captain; the Intelligence Chief, a gunnery sergeant; and three intelligence
analysts, two non-commissioned officers and one junior enlisted. This team
4The author conducted a telephone interview with the head of NMIST
Command Support Office (CS-1A), DIA, LTCOL Marshall, USAF, on 5
December, 1990.
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will be required to conduct many overlapping and separate intelligence
duties.
The mission of the MEU intelligence section is to meet the IRs of the
MEU commander, staff, and other levels of command. Because of its limited
size, the MEU normally concentrates its assets and attention on the enemy
forces and activities that could affect the operation up to 96 hours in the
future. (MAGTF Intelligence Operations (FMFM 3-21), 1990, p. 7-12)
Therefore, the MEU finds itself operating almost wholly at the tactical level of
war; its needs are for tactical intelligence. Tactical intelligence is used for the
battle in progress and is required for the planning and conduct of tactical
operations. (MAGTF Intelligence Operations (FMFM 3-21), 1990, p. 2-2)
The MEU's IRs are satisfied by exploiting all levels of intelligence in order
to compose a tactically relevant picture of the battlefield area. All collection,
analysis, and production are toward this end. The communications and
computer systems of the intelligence architecture can make notable
contributions to the production of tactically relevant intelligence. The
primary areas for technological contribution are in recording of information,
database management, information storage and retrieval, and comparison of
informational elements during analysis. (MAGTF Intelligence Operations
(FMFM 3-21), 1990, p. 3-4)
The MEU intelligence section does not train to go ashore. The reason for
this is that MEU(SOC) missions have tended to be of short duration, with a
limited presence ashore, and command and control expected to remain afloat.
However, if the MEU command element were to go ashore, the intelligence
section would be responsible for establishing a MAGTF Combat Intelligence
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Center (CIC). The CIC is a joint effort of combining the personnel assets of the
MEU with selected personnel from the SRIG Det and possibly other
intelligence augmentees or liaison personnel from other Marine or
supporting commands as required. (MCRDAC, 1990, sect. 61)
The following is a list of functions which the ashore MEU CIC is expected
to fulfill:
• Interface with national, theater, joint/combined, and organic MEU
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and
counterintelligence activities supporting the MEU(SOC) operations.
The most significant intelligence organizations to coordinate with are
the Amphibious Task Force N-2, a possible Joint Task Force J-2, the
theater CinC J-2, theater joint intelligence center, and national
intelligence assets.
Produce intelligence for the MEU and subordinate elements.
Disseminate intelligence to the MEU commander, staff, and to senior,
adjacent, subordinate, and other commands as directed.
Establish and maintain intelligence liaison with appropriate higher,
adjacent, and supporting commands and intelligence agencies.
Perform MEU imagery and photo intelligence activities.
Conduct MEU counterintelligence activities.
Determine MEU requirements for maps, charts, graphic aids, and
imagery products and supervise appropriate distribution.
Conduct MEU special signal intelligence collection, processing, and
communications activities.
Arrange for and coordinate dissemination of weather data for the
MEU.
Produce and disseminate target intelligence and maintain liaison with
the target information sections of various units.
Prepare intelligence, special intelligence, and counterintelligence
estimates, collection and planning schedules, orders, annexes,
appendices, summaries, terrain and hydrographic studies, order of
battle studies, etc..
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• Maintain enemy situation maps and order of battle maps.
• Maintain reconnaissance, observation and surveillance plot, and status
boards as necessary. (MCRDAC, 1990, sect. 61)
The MEU CIC will normally be required to operate in a designated
Tactical-Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (T-SCIF) within the
MEU command post. Communications connectivity for the MEU S-2 ashore
is limited to: tactical secure and non-secure wireline and telephone systems;
Tactical GENSER Communications Center (TCC) for secure worldwide
GENSER teletype communications; tactical Special Security Communications
Center (SSCC) for worldwide SPINTCOMM; LF secure and non-secure radio
communications circuits; and SATCOM systems used by organic assets and
special attachments. (MCRDAC, 1990, sect. 61)
Some of the key radio nets to conduct MEU intelligence operations are:
• MAGTF Recon Net (HF/UHF SATCOM). Provides for coordination of
reconnaissance effort within the LF; reconnaissance information
collection by recon units could be transmitted directly to the LFOC or
PQ
• MAGTF Intel Net (HF/UHF SATCOM/VHF). Provides for rapid
collection and dissemination of intelligence information between CLF
and the major subordinate commands of the MEU;
• MAGTF Aerial Observation Net (UHF/VHF). Provides means of
controlling aerial observation and for transmitting information. It
may be used for adjusting supporting arms;
• NET 1 MAGTF Defense Special Security Communications System
(DSSCS) entry. Provides MAGTF commander SCI teletypewriter (TTY)
communications with external agencies via the DSSCS system;
• Net 2 MAGTF SPINTCOMM Net External (HF/VHF/SATCOM).
Provides secure TTY channel for the passing of SCI information
internally between CATF and CLF;
• Net 3 MAGTF CRITICOM Net (VHF/SATCOM). Provides CLF a
channel to adjacent service cryptologic agencies or cryptologic support
group;
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• Theater Cryptologic Support Net. Provides channel for rapid exchange
of cryptologic information with the cryptologic element of the JTF,
ATF, adjacent units, and in-theater Cryptologic Support Groups (CSGs);
• Radio Battalion CRITICOM Net (HF/VHF/SATCOM). Provides
CRTTICOM facilities to RADBN elements physically removed from the
command post in support of MEU units;
• Direct Support Unit (DSU) Collection Net (HF/VHF/UHF/SATCOM).
Provides command, direction, and reporting communications between
a RADBN Direct Support Unit (DSU) and deployed teams /sites;
• ECM Control Net (VHF). Provides direction and control of RADBN
ECM assets;
• Direction Finding (DF) Report Net (VHF). Provides communications
from DF outstations to DF control;
• Counterintelligence/HUMINT Coordination Net (VHF). Provides the
means for effecting command, control, and coordination of CIT and IP
operations and reporting;
• MAGTF Secondary Imagery Dissemination System (SIDS) Net
(SATCOM). Provides an imagery receive and transmit capability for
the CIC and the FEU and is linked to the imagery transmission device.
(SRIG, FMFM 3-22, pp. 3-37,38)
Activating any of these communications nets is a decision of the CLF, based
on the ERs of the mission /situation.
Likewise, automated data processing equipment (ADP) and other
technologies are becoming more available to the MEU commander. The
primary systems employed by the ashore MEU CIC will be a combination of
manual and automated systems. The following paragraphs describe some of
the key systems to be used by the MEU CIC.
The AN/TYQ-19 Intelligence Analysis System (IAS) Block II Upgrade is a
prototype system in response to the requirement to downsize the Intelligence
Analysis Center (IAC). The IAS is part of the LAC, which comprises systems
for secondary imagery processing and dissemination, signals intelligence,
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Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System
(TERPES), Navy, other service, theater, and national assets. The IAC's
information database is currently comprised of the Naval Intelligence
Processing System (NIPS) database. The Block II Upgrade will field LAN-
based microcomputer systems at the MEU. The IAS is be fielded in 1991.
(Concepts and Issues, 1990, p. 3-19)
The AN/UYK-85, Fleet Marine Force-End User Computer Equipment
(FMF-EUCE) is a desk-top IBM-compatible, TEMPEST certified computer that
will be the primary data entry device for all automated intelligence
information systems (Kane & Morin, 1989, pp. 57-58). It weighs 35 pounds, is
self-contained and has the ability to operate with electrical power from a
tactical vehicle. (Concepts and Issues, 1990, p. 3-18)
The Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) is a space-based radio
navigation system that will provide precise user location, within 16 meters,
anywhere on or near the earth. Signals are received from four satellites. The
Marine Corps emphasis is on the development and procurement of the
manpack/vehicular variant which will be used by all elements of Marines.
(Concepts and Issues, 1990, p. 3-4)
The AN/PSC-2, Digital Communications Terminal (DCT) is a
programmable, hand-held, input/output device that operates over tactical
radio and wireline systems. The terminal enables the user to transmit,
receive, and display preformatted and free-text messages and graphic data in
short digital bursts which minimize detection risk by decreasing on-air
transmission time. Its utility is with enhancing the speed and accuracy of
ground recon reports. (Concepts and Issues, 1990, p. 3-8)
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The Marine Corps is acquiring some limited secondary imagery
equipment for softcopy dissemination. These are SIDS devices which are
primarily prototype Northrup FISTs which have been patched together to
form an intermediate solution to tactical imagery needs ashore.
SCAMP employs all-weather remote ground sensors called Tactical
Remote Sensor System (TRSS). TRSS is smaller, lighter, and able to detect
activity using seismic, magnetic, infrared, and imaging technologies. The
current sensor equipment is obsolete and TRSS will not be fully available
until 1992. (Concepts and Issues, 1990, p. 3-20) Therefore SCAMP is not
deploying with the MEUs today.
The MEU intelligence section, SRIG Det, and CIC will be limited in
providing independent intelligence support to the subordinate elements of
the BLT, aviation squadron, and MEU Service Support Group. The
movement of that support ashore is phased in various ways and times.
Therefore, collection coverage and intelligence support must be achieved
with supporting naval, theater, and national assets. The CATF will continue
to provide intelligence support to the CLF throughout the operation, using
assets from the ARG and shipboard connectivity to shore-based nodes.
There seems to be a tension in the Marine Corps about afloat and ashore
intelligence operations. The MEUs train and rely more on afloat intelligence
architecture support than any other MAGTF. Training and planning for war
as it really is needs to fuse afloat and ashore intelligence and, to do that, must
fuse the Navy and Marine Corps intelligence architecture concepts. Landing
Forces must move from ship to shore with a compatible architecture of




interoperability are more than a matter of hardware. They include
warfighting doctrine and organizing as a team to address common threats.
The Marine Corps must circumvent the tension created by making two
separate doctrines, one for ground warfare which competes with the Army,
and another for power projection which competes with the Navy. There
should be one doctrine which guides the Marine Corps' C4I2 process.
There must be a systematic approach toward meeting many of these basic
and recurring IRs. The model of likely conflicts in the future is clear.
Reorganization of intelligence alone is not the answer. What can the Marine
Corps and its intelligence community do to obtain full intelligence support to
likely mission requirements? It is too easy to blame some other "entity(ies)"
for not supporting "us." The Marine Corps is responsible for articulating its
IRs and integrating them with theater, service, and national IRs. The Corps
must further develop its warfighting requirements to interoperate with those
of theater and service commanders. To do this a long term solution to the
Marine Corps' intelligence support problem is to solve the disjointed manner
that intelligence fits into the dynamic "closed loop" process of command and
control (C2 ). The next chapter will integrate the Marine Corps' C4I2 process
and intelligence factors with the MEU(SOC). The issue of connectivity will be
addressed as the essence of the C4I2 process/system.
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VII. C4P: ARCHITECTURE FOR WARFARE
Superior technology, purposeful movement, the application of combat
power at the proper time and place, initiative and the influence of
commanders through their C3I allow Marines to engage any enemy and
win.
General A. M. Gray, Commandant, USMC
(SIGNAL, November, 1987)
Success in combat depends greatly on fused, tailored intelligence
communicated securely and rapidly. As always, the MEU(SOC) must exploit
all tactical/combat intelligence capabilities. Therefore, a tremendously
flexible C4 I2 architecture which functions as a process of organizations,
doctrines, and technologies is required due to the expeditionary nature of the
Marine Corps. The C4 I2 mission is to be prepared, and then to enhance
operational capabilities when directed to varied threats in new locations.
(Breth, 1990, p. 44, 45) These requirements cause certain difficulties in
command and control and intelligence connectivity which are further
compounded due to the normal "fog of war."
The basic requirements of the Marine Corps C4I2 system are:
Command structures integrated across several operating levels;
Control process appropriate for the diverse forces involved;
Communications fast and secure;
Computers with their terminals, databases, information processors,
and means of networking fully exploited and integrated;
Intelligence accurate and useful; and
Interoperability of Marine Corps systems, units or forces to provide
services to and accept services from other U.S. and allied forces.
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A. WARFIGHTING PHILOSOPHY
Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, Director of Naval Intelligence, reportedly
told Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze:
You'll just have to make the decision on your own because that's the last
step in the intel process. You hear what all the intel people have to say
and then you decide what it all means. Now, you are exercising the final
command function in intelligence. ("An Oral History," 1990, p. 5)
The C4I2 architecture and within it the intelligence (sub)architecture's real
purpose for existing is to assist the commander in commanding. As Taylor's
counsel above indicates, intelligence is merely a support function for the
commander. The Marine Corps has a relatively new doctrine entitled
"maneuver warfare" which encompasses a warfighting philosophy to guide
how commanders might think of warfare and command. Success in combat
does not depend on the specific methods used, but rather in the mental
approach of the commander. Maneuver warfare relies on a distinct
philosophy of command and therefore C4I2 must incorporate it as an essential
characteristic.
The Marine Corps' approach to codifying this doctrine is to ensure that it
is consistently effective across the full spectrum of conflict and is not rigidly
applied only to certain situations. Maneuver warfare, as it applies to the LIC
environment, is a warfighting philosophy that adapts to fighting against an
ambiguous foe on his home soil in an ad hoc, time-compressed operation.
The objective is mission accomplishment, while taking minimal casualties,
with limited external support.
Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the
enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected
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actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with
which he cannot cope. (Warfighting (FMFM 1), 1989, p. 59)
The first guiding principle in the Marine Corps' philosophy of command is
"to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the
uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command must be
decentralized." (Warfighting (FMFM 1), 1989, p. 62) This is implemented by
training subordinate commanders to base their decisions on the commander's
intentions. (The rapid planning process functions to do this.) The second
principle, which helps connect the C4I2 process to the commander, is the
philosophy that command must be based on initiative, imagination, and
boldness rather than on communications and computer technology, and
command and staff procedures (Warfighting (FMFM 1), 1989, p. 62). The
commander's intent should focus on critical enemy factors. An example of
intent is the idea of eliminating the Viet Cong guerrillas' support base by
pacifying the South Vietnamese villages, which was the basis for the
generally successful but short-lived Combined Action Program (Campaigning
(FMFM 1-1), 1990, p. 39).
This suggests an absolutely revolutionary approach toward filling some of
the gaps in command and control of operations. It is reminiscent of
Napoleon's "directed telescope" concept of establishing a means of obtaining
information not apparent or available through normal reporting structures.
It cuts through the regular command hierarchy by using mutual
understanding as a means toward "implicit" communication. While in no
way a primary means of command and control, mutual understanding has an
historically well-founded utility. The qualities of good judgment, instinct and
intuition also modulate the demands on a command and control system.
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What must always be remembered is that final fusion of warfighting
information happens in the mind of the commander. Part of the intelligence
problem is the inherent uncertainty and conflicting data in every actual
operation. The lack of time for a rigorous intelligence assessment increases
the ambiguity and drives the commander to affect the situation by his own
actions, and initiative. By combining information
—
particularly intelligence
information—with an understanding of his superior's intentions, the
commander can sense problems, rapidly check strategies, bypass in-depth
analysis, and exercise his own initiative to accomplish the mission.
Commonly, this results only from a thorough knowledge of fundamental
combat actions. Through familiarity with training and procedures, a type of
coordinated autonomy is established. Should he be in doubt, a subordinate is
expected to act as his commander would want him to act. When this mutual
understanding has been developed, operations in any time-compressed
environment are greatly facilitated by the lessened need for communication
and detailed planning. Moreover, this fostering of initiative allows each
commander to concentrate more of his attention on his own responsibilities,
and less on communications with higher authority. (Warfighting (FMFM 1),
1989, p. 63)
Maneuver warfare demands a confidence among commanders and
subordinates for unity of effort. This new philosophy of command is part of
the Marine Corps' effort to refocus and reform itself in the 1990s to conduct
warfighting in terms of quality, not quantity, of efforts. Maneuver warfare
does this by emphasizing mission planning which is problem-oriented rather
than process-oriented. This fits extremely well with the unstructured
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environment of LIC and crisis response. Getting commanders to accept a
similar approach to operations actually functions to help integrate command
structures across various operating levels. Another key is flexible application
of organizational, doctrinal, and technological architectures to accomplish the
mission and adjust to ambiguous situations. This qualitative warfare
requires precise and timely intelligence on the tactical, theater, and strategic
levels. Maneuver warfare relies on individual initiative at all levels, rapid
decision-making, and free-flowing action. It achieves success by destroying
the enemy's ability to resist.
At the same time, the reason for creating a system and architecture of
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and
interoperability is to increase combat power through the transfer and effective
use of vast amounts of information. It must not be forgotten that intuition
and commander's intent cannot fill all the information gaps. So a C4 I2
architecture must provide the effective controlling process in the combat
environment; it is essential to completing the mission.
B. ORGANIZING THE C4I2 CONCEPT
At the Headquarters, Marine Corps level, the C4 I 2 Department and
concept was created to merge a wide array of departments, doctrines, and
procurement initiatives in the Marine Corps. The old paradigm of warfare
failed to integrate these separate functions efficiently. All of the DoD suffered
from this type of disjointedness. A systematic approach was missing to
effectively operate with mounting fiscal constraints, bureaucratic
parochialism, and inherent institutional and organizational impediments.
The greatest need was to meet the changing threat. As has been shown, the
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seriousness of the interoperability problem in DoD has consistently been
portrayed in lessons learned from contingency operations. The Iranian
hostage rescue attempt, the Grenada invasion, and the raid on Libya all
highlighted interoperability problems. Communications systems have
historically been the chief impediment to operating with other services and
unified /specified commands. (Breth and Phillips, 1988, p. 18). The
technologies of computer hardware and software are being tasked to solve
many of these problems. However, it is clear that organization and procedure
are as important as technological answers to the connectivity problem. The
Marine Corps is fitting itself to the new paradigm/ with the goal of all levels
of command being able to use timely all-source intelligence as the basis for
decisions. (Breth and Phillips, 1988, p. 16) MAGTF organizational and
maneuver warfare doctrine, encompassing the MEU(SOC) and SO/LIC
doctrine, categorically recognizes that the flow of intelligence is one of the
keys to successful maneuver warfare operations.
Along with this, the C4I2 Department is responsible for interoperability
within the Marine Corps, with other services, and with allies. Figure 6
depicts this merger of the C4 Systems Division and the Intelligence Division
into a C4I2 organization at Headquarters Marine Corps. To fully integrate the
functions of all and to ensure consistency, the Operational Intelligence and
Interoperability Branch was created.
In the SO/LIC environment, the first MEU(SOC) will generally have a
simple C4I2 infrastructure. This structure will need to respond rapidly to the

























































'DIRINT & DIR C4 are dual-hatted: Senior general officer designated as director C4I2.
Figure 6. C4I2 Organization
being supported. In Lebanon, 1982-84, for instance, 22 separate secure
communications links had to be established to handle U.S. Embassy, local
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government, and multinational force liaison needs. This established new
operational requirements for C4 I2 organization, procedure and equipment.
(Breth, 1990, p. 46)
C 4I2 initiatives are mainly technical (i.e., lightweight tactical sensors,
deployable data bases and fusion centers, and secure communications for both
tactical and strategic reporting and dissemination). Care must be taken not to
create a fascination with form. While the C4I2 concept could easily revolve
around communications and computer technology, it is this technology
which should revolve around the C4 I2 process. The chief benefit of any
architecture lies in the operational advantages it conveys; true proof of new
military innovations lies in their enabling combat forces to effectively execute
new tactics. (Breth, 1990, p. 48)
A difficulty in structuring a comprehensive C4 I2 system which meets
these flexible demands is that, due to the fluid, ambiguous environment in
which MEU(SOC)s operate, the details tend to blur. Applying C4 I2 , and
particularly intelligence, requires a high understanding of the principles of
conventional methods; then warfighters can adapt the rules to fit the fluid
LIC situations.
In small wars and contingency operations, it is the tactical perspective of
commander's intent which must provide the unifying direction for all
operations. Ways must be found to neutralize, seize, or destroy the most
critical component of the enemy's power. Foremost, tactical intelligence on
the environment and enemy has to be sought out. But as we have seen,
operational intelligence also must provide information on the cultural,
social, and economic aspects of the battlefield. Operational intelligence takes a
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wider view of the conflict area and a longer view over time. Intelligence
collection assets organic to the MAGTF are mostly tactical in scope. As a
result, the MAGTF commander depends on intelligence support external to
the MAGTF for sources of his operational intelligence. (Campaigning (FMFM
1-1), 1990, p. 75) He needs to bring together information his own forces are
collecting and the most complete information relevant to his operational
needs which higher-level and adjacent organizations can provide. This
requires "connectivity."
C CONNECTIVITY OF INTELLIGENCE
The philosophy behind connectivity of intelligence information for
tactical commanders contains three precepts: 1) The operating forces, whether
a BLT, ACE or CSSE, do not care where the collection assets or intelligence
fusion centers are, what organizational, communications and computer
architectures and networks exist to support their warfighting mission, or
what procedures are used in the intelligence process. While experience has
tended to show that the desired place for a force intelligence officer is at the
commander's elbow, whether the force's intelligence requirements are met by
resources in the next room or hundreds of miles away is immaterial—so long
as those requirements are satisfied in a timely manner. 2) The C4I2 network
should be unobtrusive to the mission commanders of a MEU(SOC). Less
visible system components are better. The real reason for the system is to
receive, process, and disseminate intelligence information in support of
combat planning and execution. The warfighters should be able to focus on
the mission, not the components of communications, computers and
intelligence. 3) It is the C4 I2 network that must become heterogeneous
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through connectivity of an integrated collection of organizations, doctrines,
technologies, and command philosophy. Simply put, more effort should go
to meeting operational and tactical intelligence requirements.
The information systems world calls this a "federated" approach which
enables all components to function together effectively and invisibly,
independent of the application functions of each (Senn, 1990, p. 506). So,
connectivity is more than a communications problem or computer
hardware/software problem. Connectivity of intelligence is essentially the
unimpeded "whatever it takes" direction and flow of intelligence
information; the right product at the right time provided to the operators.
Therefore, besides connectivity within the electromagnetic spectrum,
connectivity of intelligence involves unquantifiable factors, such as those
found in human psychology. Flexibility in system design and use is the key to
making connectivity both a means and an objective.
This chapter outlined the significant aspects of the Marine Corps'
command and control architecture. The next chapter examines two current
initiatives being sponsored by the U.S. Navy. The Marine Corps is in a
position to influence these initiatives by articulating its own operational
requirements clearly and continually through the developmental processes.
The first initiative is a new conceptual architecture for naval C3I, based on
operational technology. The second initiative is a (sub)architecture called
Intelligence Support to Strike and Amphibious Forces (ISS/AF). ISS/AF is an
effort by the Navy to focus on the particular needs of its power projection
forces. The Marine Corps would do well to integrate its own C4I2 and IAC
systems into those of the Navy.
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VIII. EXPANDING C4I2 FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
MARINES CAN USE
...to move into the 21st century, we must solve two problems. The first
is to develop new technologies to integrate sensors, facilitate tactical
decision-making, and solve communications capacity problems. The
second is to build and articulate a new architecture, organizational
infrastructure, and doctrine to integrate both modern war at sea and
crisis management.
VADM J.O. Turtle, USN
Director, Space and Electronic Warfare
(Loescher, 1991, p. 86)
A. OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
The Marine Corps has not fully integrated its concepts of C2, though it is
capturing that understanding in the formulation of C4I2 . Call it what you
will, C2, C3 I, or C4I2, it should all be the same thing: a conceptual system of
abstract and physical components that must interact with a purpose. It is a
way of looking at warfare as an integration of components designed to assist
the tactical commander in accomplishing his mission. An intelligence
(sub)system or architecture should fit into the larger C4I2 construct. If Marines
cannot envision themselves operating within such a warfighting system,
then coordinating the Marine Corps for the next battle will be extremely
difficult.
The Navy is beginning to implement changes to the way it conceptualizes
command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) for many of the
same reasons the Marine Corps created C4 I2 . While the Marine Corps'
traditional perspective has focused doctrine on a philosophy of warfare and
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task organization of forces, it is less strong in developing technological aids.
However, technology is the Navy's strong point, and its new C3I concept is
based on "operational technology." The Navy is seeking to join all aspects of
high technology to new command and control doctrine to serve operational
commanders. The Navy considers this a shift in its traditional perspective
from technology per se to operations, and calls it the "Copernicus
Architecture." (Loescher, 1991, p. 86-88) The Marine Corps could benefit by
encouraging and joining the Navy's efforts to streamline its C3I architecture.
The time for integrating warfighting concepts has never been better.
The fundamental C3I problem of the Navy is that it has a proliferation of
sensors, different report formats, organizational sponsors, complex
programmatic agendas, and conflicting operational goals. Each shore-based
and platform-based sensor, and each organization that sponsors it, has
become an end to itself. Today there are too many formats for record
messages, system-dedicated communications nets, proliferation of different
hardware and software; and there is a tendency for the Navy to be locked
technically and doctrinally on the Soviets as the threat. (Loescher, 1991, p. 88)
Additionally, the operational command structure of the Navy has
traditionally been from Fleet CinC to the ship. It has not indoctrinated itself
that the naval power projection mission is "in progress" until its force
elements are safely back on ship and the naval role in theater is complete.
C 3I support to regional conflict or peacetime contingencies is quite
different from that required for blue-water operations. Experience has shown
that most contingency operations have had ad hoc connectivity and
makeshift command centers. The intelligence doctrine and C3I support
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infrastructure has not been responsive to the contingency intelligence
requirements. The task is how to focus every available intelligence asset in
the nation's inventory into a fused, timely, tactically useful product, and then
get that product to the warfighters, whether Marines, sailors, or naval
aviators. The technical answer lies in making all communications
datastreams interchangeable across all frequencies (HF, UHF, SHF, and EHF).
Each bandwidth must be capable of being loaded tactically. Another solution
lies in changing the traditional IRs of the Navy to more realistic ones. Then,
intelligence centers could fuse all collection assets above tactical and link a
tailored product to the shooters. (Loescher, 1991, p. 89) Only when the tactical
commander is the focus of intelligence support can intelligence be considered
a force multiplier.
All services could gain from linking their concepts of C3I. It could be said
that intelligence support to joint operations will increasingly fall to naval-
based intelligence organizations, because of their day-to-day focus on current
operations. The Navy has dedicated operational intelligence organizations
that historically have been "turned on" to provide crisis support. Captain
E.D. Smith, USN, offers the example of the Joint Task Force Middle East
(JTFME) that was heavily supported with prolonged near-real-time
operational intelligence, drawing heavily on Fleet Ocean Surveillance
Intelligence Facility (FOSIF) WestPac and Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific
(FICPAC). (Smith, 1989, p. 2) Of course, Marines were an integral part of that
naval force and part of FICPAC's Strike and Amphibious Warfare Intelligence
Cell (SAWIC) and production departments.
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The new Navy Copernicus Architecture proposes four significant changes
in the Navy's grand concept of C3 I: construct a standardized, global, shore-
based network called Global Information Exchange System (GLOBIXS);
consolidate existing fleet command centers; construct and arrange tactical nets
into a series called Tactical Data Exchange System (TADIXS) to consolidate
non-organic sensor data from GLOBIXS with organic assets afloat; and, since
the TFCC will be the tactical focal point, establish "value-added" criteria for
each element of the system. Conceptually, this new architecture will revolve
around operational warfighting requirements—rather than the warfighting
capabilities revolving around disconnected communications and computer
capabilities. (Loescher, 1990, pp. 89-93) Only then will the Navy have
connectivity of ashore and afloat organizations. A connected architecture also
allows simultaneous fusion ashore and afloat. Similar to the Marine Corps'
concept of C4I2, an umbrella architecture will only be revolutionary if it fuses
intelligence for the tactical user. To do that efficiently, the operational experts
must devise the system to meet the requirements of decentralized users.
The operators in the Marine Corps must understand their own
requirements for C4I2 . The Corps must solve the "meta-issues" and make
fixes therein. The context for this effort is clear—"war as it really is." If a unit
is attacked by snipers, then it centralizes behind obstacles. If the unit is
attacked by artillery, then it displaces and spreads out. If the unit is
encountering landmines, then it moves in a column. One looks at the
patterns of history and determines what the requirements are.
U.S. military operations in Lebanon, 1958, Dominican Republic, 1965,
Lebanon, 1982-84, Grenada, 1983, and Liberia, 1990 provide a model of likely
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future conflict and implications of intelligence support to those conflicts that
deserves careful attention. The model is based on specific lessons learned; but
such "lessons" should be considered tactics, not strategy. A strategy for the
future development of Marine Corps intelligence can only be derived from
examining and making explicit the recurring intelligence themes that appear
to come from these operations and then develop an umbrella concept for
addressing these themes in the future.
The following "themes" should be considered by the Marine Corps in
merging its C4I2 architecture with the Navy's and other services':
There is a blurring of service boundaries requiring Joint operations and
interdependent SOPs;
Combined forces are a new trend;
A global perspective of LIC is being developed;
Operations will be at a faster pace;
Crisis response times will be short, so capabilities must increase;
There is an increased complexity of management, leadership, and
command;
There will be a greater dependence on intelligence and other
information;
There will be a search for high-tech solutions;
There is a search for changed human thinking to meet such an
environment;
There is a need for tactically relevant and unambiguous order of battle
data;
There is criticality of timely HUMINT and SIGINT and IMINT sources;
Accurate and current maps and charts will be needed;
Future operations will involve media reporting (e.g., CNN), which
must be supported; and,
Area expertise cannot continue to be ignored.
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C 4I2 is a conceptual system that involves physical systems operating in
relation with each other. There will be a perpetual lack of connectivity of
intelligence without such a general "systems view" of the problems. Yet, by
thoughtfully and incrementally revising our organizations, doctrine, and
technologies to fit the new paradigm, we can effectively bring Marine Corps
intelligence into the 1990s.
The chief difficulty is that the method of defining meta-issues is
constantly disconnected and frustrated by the details. Intelligence is part of
the solution, but at times the architecture is more the problem. The
significance of the intelligence architecture is that it generates greater
problems. The warfighting architectures of the Navy, Marine Corps, Army,
and Air Force must be joined. That is generally a function of DoD; however,
today one could even add the Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA),
State Department and embassies, etc. Articulating the requirements of the
most used Marine Corps unit, the ARG/MEU(SOC), is a good focal point for
addressing the larger issues. The ARG/MEU(SOC) can also be the focal point
for designing intelligence support technology that is compatible with Navy
and Marine Corps needs. The Navy has unique managerial and technical,
and more financial, resources to bring to bear on the problem. The Navy may
view their sponsorship role as primarily power projection support, and the
Marine Corps can utilize that support for its expeditionary forces. The effect
will be the same: integrated operational architectures that satisfy shared
military requirements. An example of how Navy and Marine Corps
intelligence requirements can be integrated is the ISS/AF concept.
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B. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES
This thesis has defined the most likely threat environment in which
Marines will find themselves: peacetime contingencies and peacekeeping
operations. The Navy defines their threat environment as having four types:
global, regional, contingency and limited objective warfare (CALOW), and
special operations (counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, etc.). This is a recent
change that certainly impacts the Navy's Maritime Strategy concept. It
represents the way the Navy/Marine Corps expect to fight the next war.
Some of the C3I systems that represent this new way of fighting are: TFCC/FP,
JOTS, POST, PC-NIPS, GPS, and ISS/AF. (Turtle, J.O., 1990, p. 1)
The long term goal of the ISS/AF concept is to enhance afloat and ashore
intelligence support nodes in meeting the IRs of power projection forces.
Here, the Navy is seeking a technological solution to make all intelligence
systems and communications interoperable. (Naval Intelligence Activity,
1991, p. 2) This melds well with the Navy's operational technology C3I
concepts.
DoD has a key role in achieving this interoperability, for they must
sponsor the standardization of intelligence communications systems, ADP
data storage and transmission formats, and support joint service
interoperable data exchange, storage and retrieval systems. The DoD,
Copernicus, and ISS/AF all focus on integration of existing systems.
On a Navy/Marine Corps level, the primary need is for a joint program
sponsor to guide ISS/AF support (CG FMFPAC message, 1990, para. 7. D). No
ISS/AF program has been sanctioned by CNO and CMC. However, each has
established independent programs which include USMC Intelligence
88
Analysis System (IAS) and CNO's ISS/AF Extended Intelligence Support
Terminal (X-IST). Each has proposed operational requirements which seek to
establish common requirements compatible with joint operations and to
expedite, as well as coordinate, all future tactical user support. (CG FMFPAC
message, 1990, para. 11)
A fundamental problem in receiving and disseminating intelligence is
that the system is not streamlined to meet critical IRs. In the past decade
there has been a growth of microcomputers and workstations; the
sophistication of shore-based sensors has made global surveillance and
electronic warfare a possibility. What has evolved is a procession of advanced
technology prototypes that are intended to help operational commanders; in
fact, the more little problems these individual systems temporarily fix, the
more obvious it becomes that there are larger, deeper problems. The Marine
Corps must decide the form and substance of its requirements, with grave
attention to constantly recurring operational items that are translated into
operational requirements for system development. The words "system" and
"architecture" have different meanings to different people; "system (or
architecture) development" should not imply that some single acquisition
can solve all existing shortfalls. The C4I2 architecture should function to
control the warfighting effort by integrating the various organizations,
doctrines, and technologies with a focus on recurring primary IRs. A useful
model for analyzing the shortfalls in the flow of intelligence is found in
Figure 7, the "intelligence pipeline."
Intelligence to national and unified/specified headquarters comes from a
plethora of national and theater sources. The problems at the national and
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U&S levels are duplication of intelligence production and control and
coordination of intelligence dissemination. Intelligence then flows to the
component command CinCs or commanders of JTFs while in garrison. The
MEFs are included here. There are good fixed communications sites at these
locations, especially for DSNET 3 and STU III. However, there are gaps in
having poor technological systems to download intelligence to the deployed
MAGTF commanders. SCI and GENSER traffic compete for air time. The
next lower level in the intelligence pipeline is the deployed CJTF or Battle
Group commander. The best communications connectivity for these forces is
on the flagships or at the deployed JTF headquarters. Their problems mostly
involve the deconfliction of intelligence data in the JIC.
OPERATIONAL
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Figure 7. Intelligence Pipeline
This thesis suggests that the focus of intelligence support should be at the
level of the pipeline where combat forces are deployed on shore in a combat
environment or to naval strike and amphibious forces (power projection)
aboard ship. There are severe FLTSATCOM constraints for these
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commanders to deal with and a reliance on very extended communications
networks. The focus of effort for providing intelligence support should be the
expeditionary forces. That intelligence dissemination support will depend on
the force's mobility. Expeditionary forces currently have a heavy reliance on
in-country telephone systems and tactical satellites. All the tactical
equipment must be extremely portable, reliable, and ruggedized. The
expeditionary commander must rely on tactical radio links to most of his
organic units. The dissemination problems create a lack of intelligence
connectivity to the tactical commander, so the intelligence collected and
produced at higher headquarters has few ways to get to the tactical
commander except by hand-delivery or using the sparse communications
capabilities of the tactical forces.
Power projection requires intelligence concerning a land-oriented
environment, including coastal waters contiguous to that land, as well as the
air spaces over each. Multi-source reporting of ground events needs to be
cross-correlated with terrain and geographic data, then graphically displayed
on maps and images to be more fully understood and analyzed. Ground
intelligence is fused with information concerning weather, terrain,
installations, orders-of-battle, characteristics and performance, geopolitical
context, and enemy locations and intentions. Sources that need to be fused
include IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, open sources, maps, and existing
intelligence products. (BTG, 1990, p. 1)
All-source fusion of intelligence has been identified as a critical need for
tactical operators. In fact, fusion for intelligence production should happen
proportionally at every level of command. Each level of command must
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identify what products they can produce for themselves and more
importantly their subordinates. The idea of a pipeline also works for fusion
centers that narrows to the needs of the tactical commander. In a small
war/small unit environment it becomes obvious that without the
"seductive" high technology, fusion must finally happen in the mind of the
commander. The battlefield commander demanding current detailed
information actually conducts the final fine-grained analysis tailored to his
needs. This change in thinking requires guidance to come from the NCA (as
recommended by the JCS) and the theater unified commanders because they
are the warfighters on whose authority the MEU(SOC) will be operating.
They will also provide the rationale for prioritization and authority for the
production of intelligence. The ARG/MEU will articulate its IRs and the
CinC must use those IRs to clearly define intelligence goals and priorities.
The CinCs must also refocus their C4I2 to meet the needs of the warfighters.
The Navy and Marine Corps at the fleet and FMF levels are anxious to
ensure connectivity with the Navy's concept of C3I and future evolutionary
development compatible with the Navy's "Copernicus Architecture." At
these sub-service levels in Norfolk, VA and Hawaii, there is a continuous
push for the development of prototype efforts for intelligence support
systems (e.g., power projection workstations, X-IST, TERPES, and IAS). At
this level of command there is a focus to develop the infrastructure and
connectivity to support: Crisis Support Cells, Maritime Operational
Intelligence Cells (MOIC), JTFs for counter-narcotics, and mobile JTFs. The
new joint intelligence centers, JICPAC and AIC, are driving for secure
teleconferencing from Washington to units in WestPac and the Med. The
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analyst teleconferencing from national to theater to tactical levels is
envisioned for the near future. Until then, the immediate need is for
improved information and dissemination management. This is done by
simply ensuring correct and only essential addressees are on all messages to
ensure efficient use of communications resources. (CG FMFLANT message,
1990)
There continues to be a strong requirement for a 24-hour all-source
Oplntel capability dedicated to supporting strike and amphibious warfare.
Great strides have been made to provide quality, timely intelligence to power
projection commanders. These commanders report their continuous need
for direct, tailored, near-real-time Oplntel. (CG FMFPAC message, 1990, para.
4.A)
What is lacking most is an integrated, automated ISS/AF capability with
communications connectivity to any level of USN/USMC or JTF
commander. Interservice and cross-theater dissemination is needed. The
two Fleet Marine Force (FMF) commands, Pacific and Atlantic, both are
urging the development of an effective telecommunications architecture as
the most significant problem facing the implementation of an ISS/AF
capability. ISS/AF telecommunications support requirements must
emphasize the existing requirements for fast, secure, and reliable record and
non-record telecommunications to receive and disseminate intelligence
information in a variety of forms (voice, textual data, graphics, and imagery).
These requirements for ISS/AF are also similar to the operational technology
C3I problems. Additionally, the telecommunications support should be
designed with the capability to expand to accommodate future requirements
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(e.g., taped video, live video teleconferencing, etc.). Ashore units must be
capable of functioning to support an air-lifted contingency force while en
route to any objective area. (CG, FMFLANT message, 1990, para, e)
The systems architecture must have three tiers of hardware/software
(workstations): shore-based nodes; afloat-based nodes embarked on strike and
amphibious ships; and deployable ashore-nodes, which must be ruggedized,
portable, have multi-level security, and be capable of transmitting and
receiving from shore and afloat intelligence centers.
The primary operationally responsive ISS/AF fusion centers ashore need
to be located at each MEF's MAFC and at the numbered fleet and theater JICs.
They will provide time-sensitive I&W data and rapid responses to any
intelligence query from deployed afloat or ashore commands. Each fusion
center's watch officer will immediately cross-cue all available intelligence
resources for enhanced analytical support or collection management.
Deployable afloat and ashore intelligence architectures will simply be scaled
down systems of the shore-based ones. There is no need for fusion centers at
the FMF or fleet CinC level of command.
Currently, CINCPACFLT is providing collection management
responsibilities for operational Navy and Marine commands. However,
these functions could be absorbed by the numbered fleet headquarters, which
would validate their requirements with a theater collection manager at
JICPAC. FMFPAC has basically relinquished any collection management
functions for Marine forces; as a result, the system seems to be more
responsive to operational requirements. Essentially, FMFPAC has found that
it is more useful in an administrative peacetime role than by mediating
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operational control of any deployed forces. The idea of removing FMF and
fleet CinCs from operational responsibilities is not new and needs to be
researched further.5
It is then the operational components and theater intelligence fusion
centers that must be able to telecast threat and intelligence updates to fleet and
field commanders, providing textual and graphic information, and allowing
immediate query and response to the tactical commander's IRs. This would
be comprehensive intelligence support using such tools as automated
"smart" workstations. The workstations could handle receipt of requests for
information (RFIs) and /or CRITICs. These key operational support
commands would be able to provide research, analysis, preparation, and
transmission of tailored intelligence products. The smaller deployed afloat
and ashore systems must possess communications and analysis capabilities
which are ADP compatible with the larger nodes. (CG FMFPAC message, 1990,
para. 4-6) ISS/AF is a good concept. Parochialism aside, it is configured to the
needs of the most likely type of conflict of Navy/Marine Corps power
5The author attended the annual Admiral Cooke Fleet CinC Planners
Conference held at the Naval Postgraduate School in March 1991. The idea of
the conference was to discuss the "need for a new focus for the new strategy"
and provide an interchange of planners' ideas. A key point agreed on by all
participants was that tomorrow's war will be fought by component
commanders under a JTF. The functional service component commanders
therefore will find themselves "getting out of the deliberate planning
business" and no longer being warfighters. Theater CinCs are the highest and
lowest level of operator between a JTF command and the NCA. Additionally,
the Marine Corps has been examining how to reduce redundant
headquarters. A good article is "Does the Marine Corps Still Need Separate
Type Commands?" (Leonhardt, 1990, pp. 20-21)
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projection forces and is capable of being tailored to the warfighting concepts of
other services.
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IX. THE FUTURE OF MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE
Marine Corps intelligence is at a crossroad. A principal concern is that the
absence of intelligence guidance and priorities from the warfighting
commanders and theater commanders will result in a continued diffusion of
intelligence support efforts. Because U.S. intelligence is pushed to support a
wide range of national defense problems does not mean that Marine Corps
intelligence should be similarly widely focused. While the bulk of Marine
Corps collection, analysis, and production systems and personnel continues to
focus on the tactical problems across the spectrum of conflict, the latest
doctrinal and organizational changes have been to operate in LIC. For the
missions the Marine Corps has been involved in, intelligence support has not
been very good. It appears extremely difficult to set realistic intelligence
policy in the Marine Corps. The problem cannot be said to be that there are
too many intelligence requirements to be met; rather, an insufficient
commitment to concentrate on what is important. Perhaps intelligence
officers have been reluctant to admit how little they really know, while
commanders and their operations officers do not want to say how indefinite
their own plans are. Having identified recurring themes of intelligence
requirements based on real experiences of the Marines, and proposed changes
within the Marine Corps intelligence community to meet these
requirements, this thesis will conclude with suggestions to resolve some key
intelligence problems.
The Marine Corps must have a tactical aerial imagery/reconnaissance
capability for the MEU(SOC). The national systems support must be pursued
vigorously, but the most responsive support is from organic systems. The
answer lies in acquiring the latest unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems
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and installing them aboard various amphibious ships. The best technology
and doctrine is spread among several UAVs already in service. Also, wet-
film pod systems already exist for AV-8 Harriers (the British use one) and
could even be put on helicopters; but acquisition and development projects
were canceled with guidance to wait for the Advanced Tactical
Reconnaissance System (ATARS) digital sensor suite in the mid-to-late 1990s.
Unfortunately, this down-linked imagery capability is only planned for the
F/A-18D aircraft, which will not help today's or tomorrow's ARG/MEU.
(Concepts and Issues, 1990, p. 3-51)
SIGINT is an area in which the Marine Corps has done fairly well. Radio
Battalion assets are being innovatively used. However, the LIC environment
has ever-changing SIGINT targets and requires EW assets that can exploit
non-military, low-technology communications as well as traditional HF and
VHF systems.
Another issue that deserves closer analysis is the manner in which the
Navy focuses nearly all of its tactical intelligence collection systems to support
Carrier Battle Groups. There is a wealth of aerial imagery and signal
exploitation capability on the carrier with the RF-14 TARPS, EA-6B "Prowler,"
and E-2C "Hawkeye." Additionally, the CVBG has "Classic Outboard"
equipped ships with HF/DF and enhanced SIGINT capabilities. A study of
naval missions and intelligence collection systems while applying the
principle of "economy of force" should be done in a review of naval force
composition and deployment schedules.
The key deficiency in intelligence support is in HUMINT. For instance,
support to the NEO forces involves locating, establishing a disposition, and
evaluating the intentions of many "players." This is reliant on non-technical
intelligence with emphasis on overt and covert human collection of
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information. The Marine Corps must go beyond its forte in combat
interrogations and detainee exploitation. HUMINT in LIC requires fine-grain
qualitative analysis that is nearly at the investigative level, much like what
the FBI does. It requires a different analytical mind-set and thereby produces a
unique product. (Kerr interview, 1991, p.30)
HUMINT in most cultures takes a long time to develop. At the center of
the HUMINT problem is collection, and the service assets do not have a
mandate to operate in most places. Another problem is that the U.S.
government and military bureaucracies want intelligence to be quantifiable.
HUMINT, if it can be evaluated properly, can reveal enemy intentions better
than most other types of intelligence, but it is difficult to quantify HUMINT
successes. 6 The local populace represents the most lucrative sources of
information. IRs can be met only by recording minute details on a great
variety of subject areas. Each one of these details may appear unrelated to
others and insignificant by itself; but when mapped and chronologically
recorded over long periods of time and analyzed with other details, they may
lead to definitive and predictable patterns of enemy behavior. Predicting
enemy intent emphasizes the unconventional qualitative considerations of
psychological, political, sociological, and economic factors.
The most intense effort for the Marine Corps must be to train in the
processing of HUMINT. Processing is a five-part procedure: 1) record all
human source information; 2) establish evaluation criteria for pertinence and
6The author attended a class by guest lecturer, Lieutenant Colonel Terry
Johnson, USA, intelligence officer and Foreign Area Officer (FAO) on 9 April
1990, at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
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accuracy; 3) isolate the key elements of data and compare them with historical
data; 4) integrate the key data using deductive reasoning and analytical
methods; and 5) interpret the data to create the HUMEMT product. Then, fuse
the HUMEMT product to all other intelligence. The need is for seamless
intelligence support from national down to tactical levels. A major gap in
Marine Corps intelligence is that there is no suitable structure for HUMINT
support to expeditionary forces.
The concept of merging operational intelligence to tactically specific
intelligence should be the focus of the Marine Corps intelligence architecture.
This thesis has identified the likely type of conflict in which the Marine Corps
will find itself involved in the near future. The operational and tactical
intelligence requirements clearly establish themselves time and time again to
become uniformities of war as it really is. One might think that a study of the
problems could recommend clear solutions that make all the problems go
away. But there are no perfect solutions. Problems are always going to exist
and there is little that can be done to fix some of them. But, a warfighting and
intelligence architecture should steer and control where that focus of effort
should be; it should distinguish which problems are acceptable and can be
tolerated from those which are unacceptable and must be remedied. Here, the
criterion proposed has been war as it really is for the Marine Corps. One
should do well what one is required to do the most; it is acceptable—when
one cannot do everything—to not do as well on less likely requirements. The
simple philosophy behind this is that no organization can do everything
well—the Marine Corps must be extremely good at the mission it is uniquely
assigned to perform, again and again, even if this entails sharply diminished
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capabilities for missions which Marines conceivably could be—but rarely
are—assigned. In short, for the down-sizing of U.S. military forces in the
1990s, the Marine Corps needs to optimize its capabilities for its highest-
priority missions.
The development of an operationally oriented Marine Corps intelligence
architecture remains the cornerstone of the effort in identifying IRs and
deficiencies down to the likely warfighting echelon. Using a systems analysis
approach, the architecture must be designed to ensure shipboard and ashore
MAGTFs "plug-in" to theater intelligence assets/systems; provide a basis for
developing Marine Corps intelligence capabilities; and assist all CinCs in
articulating specific MAGTF IRs. Existing (sub)architectures must be subjected
to a thorough cross-command analysis to further identify deficiencies.
Intelligence solutions will take various forms, including acquisition of
systems and changing doctrines and organizations. MAGTF units must be
evaluated on the basis of their assigned missions, which in turn, are used to
determine IRs. The capabilities of the intelligence node at each echelon of
command are then documented as the baseline architecture and compared to
a desired architecture. What the Marine Corps absolutely must do, is ensure
integration of its intelligence requirements into the intelligence requirements
studies conducted by service, national and defense agencies, and understand
that there are long delays between identification of IRs and systems
development and installation.
In designing the Marine Corps intelligence architecture, there are three
factors to consider:
• First, choose where the focus of effort will be. Does the Marine Corps
want to ensure its ability to talk with the British Army, as was the need
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in Kuwait? Does the Marine Corps want to paint all of its equipment
"white" to enhance speedy transition for operating in Norway? Should
equipment be painted "sand" color because we fought in the desert for
six months? Should equipment be "jungle" colored because we may
fight there? The point is that the Marine Corps cannot be equally ready
to do everything and operate everywhere. A choice must be made.
This thesis recommends focusing on the intelligence needs of an
ARG/MEU(SOC) in peacetime contingencies as our first priority.
• Second, identify the price of choosing. The Marine Corps cannot solve
all of the problems incurred in planning to fight anywhere and across
the spectrum of conflict. Some things will still be problems. There will
always be some equally inconclusive alternative choices to make.
There will be types of conflict for which the Marine Corps will not be
particulary well-suited. Optimization of the Marine Corps as a force in
readiness means that it will be ready for some types of military
requirements at the cost of being not so ready for others.
• Finally, identify the criteria for choosing. Nothing could be more
simple: what do we do most often? The author believes that there are
going to be many more Lebanons, Dominican Republics, Grenadas, and
Liberias than Vietnams and Operation DESERT STORMs. Focus on
"war as it really is"; plan to win.
Distressingly, while the Marine Corps lacks a clearly articulated
intelligence architecture that encompasses all sizes of MAGTFs across the full
spectrum of conflict, the systems connectivity seems to be less a problem at
MEB and MEF size units and is absolutely unsatisfactorily addressed for the
ARG/MEU(SOC). The connectivity issues are not being understood and
probed for solution at the MEU(SOC) level. Mission area analysis has to be
done to articulate the smallest MAGTF IRs. (Thomas, Interview, 1991)
Only when the above analysis has been accomplished will the Marine
Corps be able to achieve streamlined, detailed intelligence information flow
to the right echelon: the tactical warfighting commander. These forces
deserve full-time intelligence support of all types. Unless those who
determine the direction of the Marine Corps intelligence future are ruthlessly
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focused on the needs of the troops in the trenches, understand their issues,
and know what commanders' objectives are, how the doctrine works, and
how forces are organized, they cannot possibly provide either relevant or
timely intelligence that will contribute to better informed decisions. Those
who influence the battle are the people who need C4 I2 support. The
experience of the Marine Corps in conflict indicates that the national and
theater decision makers obtain the necessary information to plan and execute
a military response, but the information gets bottlenecked or the detail of
intelligence does not have the depth beyond the "big picture." Of course, the
"big picture" is easy, compared to the tactical details—but tactical details
determine who lives and dies, who wins and loses. Both within the Marine
Corps and in larger programmatic and operational discussions, there must be
advocates of the Marine Corps' needs for critical tactical details.
The contribution this thesis has made for Marine Corps intelligence is, in
one sense, nothing innovative. The thesis has taken many disparate parts of
intelligence problems that recur in Marine Corps operations and put them
together in a single analytic context. That context is war as it really is. The
MEU(SOC) in LIC will likely be the next military requirement for Marines.
Unless we improve our current intelligence support, five years from now we
will see again the same deficiencies as Marines have described in after-action
reports in 1958, 1965, 1983, 1984, and 1990.
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APPENDIX. RAPID RESPONSE PLANNING PROCESS
The rapid response planning process is a tool for planning contingency
response missions. It was developed in Fleet Marine Force Atlantic
(FMFLANT) in 1988 and is now being used for MEU(SOC) training "work-
ups" for all MEU(SOC)s prior to deployment. The brief description given here
is from an article written in the Marine Corps Gazette, by Col. William M.
Rakow and LtCol. Clyde S. Brinkley in June 1989 (pp.1 8-21). The key source is
Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic located at Little Creek, Virginia.
PRIORTO RECEIPT OF THE MISSION
• Prepare SOPs
• Identify Battle Staff and Orders Group
• Prepare generic intelligence requirements (GIR) for potential missions
• Prepare objective folders for potential "targets"
• Develop notional plans
• Conduct drills, staff exercises, and situational training exercises (STX),
and
• Inspect readiness of personnel, equipment, aircraft, and ammunition
THE BASICS FOR THE SOPS
• Readiness checklists/SOPs/playbook
• Battle staff/orders group composition
• "Half Rule"
• Common reference system
• Drills, staff exercises, and STX
• Cross training
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• Detailed order to include:
Air plan
Fire support plan
Communications plan and brevity codes
- "Bump" and "No Go" plans
Withdrawal plan
Ammunition strike-up plan
• Preformatted confirmation brief
• Simplicity
• Weapons firing test, and
• Rehearsals
The purpose for these is so everybody knows.
In an amphibious operation, the commanders of the MAGTF and ARG
become the CLF and CATF respectively. This relationship is clarified by
adhering to basic doctrinal decisions. "Turf battles" must be avoided to save
precious time.
BASIC DECISIONS FROM NWP-22B
PROBLEM
















CLF formulates, CATF supports
CLF selects
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• HLZs/DZs CLF selects, CATF reviews for
supportability
• H-Hour/D-Day CATF consults CLF and selects
In preparing for future missions, information collection begins well
before deployment based on generic intelligence requirements. The staff
creates "objective folders" that include maps, photographs, scale models,
order of battle, target listings, etc. The planning process follows 14 general
steps.
14 STEP RAPID RESPONSE PLANNING PROCESS
1) Receipt of mission
• Acknowledge receipt
Assemble the battle staff
2) Mission analysis
• Determine mission precedence (routine, priority, emergency)
• Analyze implied tasks
• Arrange task sequence
• Identify constraints
• If necessary, ask for clarification
Issue the standby order
3) Determine information requirements
• Enemy situation
• Capabilities








4) Initial staff orientation
• Ensure all "players" are present
5) MAGTF commander's planning guidance
• Restate mission
• Major action to be accomplished
• Assumption/previous decisions /restrictions
• Courses of action to be considered /ignored
• Phasing instructions





Reliance on particular arm












• Combat service support/medical
• Combat engineer guidance
• Rehearsals
6) Develop courses of action (C/A)






• Normally prepared by commander designated to execute the mission
• May be provided by MAGTF commander
• C/A's must provide alternatives
Courses of action
• Express task and include what, when, where, and as much of how
necessary for understanding
• Prepared by GCE (or commander designated to execute the operation),
and
• MAGTF commander must approve prior to estimate
7) MAGTF commander approves courses of action
8) Staff estimates
• Prepared by MAGTF staff and MAGTF elements
• Rapid
• Oral
• Based on STX experience







• Analysis of opposing C/As
• Comparison of our C/As
• Decision, and
Issue the Warning order
10) MAGTF concept of operation
Commander's intent






Combat service support concept
Phasing/sequence of major events
11) Preparation of detailed plan
Review existing plan
Select plan or run "audible"
Modify plans
12) MAGTF commander's approval and,
Commander's confirmation brief
13) Issue the order
14) Commander and staff supervision
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